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INTRODUCTION
Cell phones. Home mortgages. Online music. Health insurance.
Vacation packages. Employment. Standard form contracts are used to
secure luxuries and necessities alike. Indeed, nearly every written
transaction carried out by Americans today is governed by a
standardized form. 1
Standard forms are ubiquitous, but hardly innocuous. In fact, form
contracts are rife with the potential for abuse. Their nature and
universality permit drafters to impose any number of onerous terms on
unwary consumers, including arbitration agreements, class action
waivers, liquidated damages provisions, warranty disclaimers,
exculpatory clauses, and choice-of-law provisions. 2 Form contracts
even empower drafters to shift risks at will, often without warning,
through unilateral change-of-terms clauses—an increasingly common
favorite of credit card issuers, banks, utility companies, and a host of
other merchants and service providers. 3 Although essential to the
American economy, form contracts expose consumers to a parade of
one-sided, risk- and rights-shifting provisions.
The potential for abuse inherent in form contracting is intensified
both by consumer behavior and by market forces at work in consumer
transactions. A wealth of legal and interdisciplinary scholarship has
definitively established that meaningful, voluntary assent to
standardized terms is an impossibility, as consumers are largely unable
to understand the contracts that they sign and are virtually powerless to
find better terms elsewhere in the market. 4 Experts have long
acknowledged that consumers do not read form contracts before signing
them, 5 and have recently come to better understand the more
fundamental, and sobering, truths about standard contracts: consumers
who actually read consumer contracts do not understand them, either
1. David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80
U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 431 (2009) [hereinafter Horton, Flipping the Script].
2. Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 229–30 (2007);
see infra Part II.A.
3. Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on the Use of
Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1101–06 (2010). See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370–
71 & n.338 (1960) [hereinafter, LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS] (arguing that it is conceivable
to have no assent at all to unreasonable boilerplate terms in a contract when the boilerplate
language undermines the reasonable meaning of the terms agreed to by the parties); Edith R.
Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for
Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 469
(2008) (“People who sign standard form contracts rarely read them.”).
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because they lack the requisite legal training, 6 or worse, basic literacy
skills. 7 Literate, savvy consumers suffer from cognitive limitations that
render them unlikely to apprehend the meaning of and risks inherent in
standard terms. 8 Market forces do not, as some once predicted, regulate
the use of the most egregious terms. 9 And, as consumers increasingly
“sign” onto unfavorable and one-sided terms with the mere click of a
mouse, one can only predict an increase in abusive boilerplate. 10
Despite their widespread use and marked departure from the classical
model of the negotiated contract, standardized forms remain almost
entirely unregulated. The primary, if not only, line of defense against
unfair terms in standard form contracts is the general contract doctrine
of unconscionability. 11 For decades, however, this doctrine has been an
ineffectual tool for consumer protection. 12 Although unconscionability
was mainstreamed into American contract law to empower judges to
openly police unfair contracts, 13 the persistence of contract formalism—
with its emphasis on freedom of will and assent and deemphasis on
contractual fairness—discourages decision makers from inquiring
whether boilerplate terms produce unacceptably harsh results.14
Moreover, a surge in popular sentiment against judicial policy making,
6. Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of
Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1270 (1993) [hereinafter Meyerson,
Reunification].
7. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 233, 234 (2002).
8. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 211, 213 (1995) (“[E]mpircial evidence shows that actors characteristically violate the
standard rational-choice or expected-utility model . . . due to the limits of cognition.”); Robert A.
Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 429, 452–54 (2002); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1291 (2003) [hereinafter Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality]; Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 599–600 (1990) [hereinafter Meyerson, Consumer
Form Contract] (“[O]nly one party in the typical consumer transaction, the business seller, will
have the necessary legal knowledge to evaluate contract terms.”).
9. Alces & Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1107 & n.22.
10. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 468. See infra Part II.A.
11. Barnes, supra note 2, at 230; Stephen E. Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More
Muscle: Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy for Contractual Overreaching, 44 GA. L. REV. 317, 326
(2010) [hereinafter Friedman, Contractual Overreaching]; Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some
Myths about Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 2 (1981) [hereinafter Hillman, Debunking Some Myths]; Warkentine, supra note 5, at
471.
12. See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L.
REV. 73, 90–102 (2006) [hereinafter Schmitz, Safety Net] (discussing the general trend of courts
toward contract formalism and other criticisms of the unconscionability doctrine).
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part III.A.
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both generally and specifically with respect to contract law, further
works against unconscionability—traditionally a flexible doctrine
calling for judicial discretion. 15
But the picture may not be so bleak. Court attention to the
unconscionability doctrine has recently resurged, particularly as applied
to consumer contracts. 16
And, as courts have reinvigorated
unconscionability as a policing tool for standardized agreements, they
have introduced into the doctrine a “sliding scale” approach that, if
properly cultivated, can empower courts, and increasingly, arbitrators,
to do what consumers, legislators, and legal scholars have yet been
unable to do—control oppression and overreaching in consumer form
contracts.
Unlike the conventional approach to unconscionability, the sliding
scale approach deemphasizes traditional, formalist markers of assent. 17
Thus, the sliding scale approach provides decision makers with an
effective means of responding to the emerging understanding of the
deep deficiencies in consumer assent. 18 Also, unlike the conventional
approach, the sliding scale permits meaningful scrutiny of contract
terms on the basis of commercial fairness. 19 Moreover, the increased
and evolving use of the sliding scale approach to unconscionability by
courts signifies that judges are gradually and subtly challenging the
doctrinal and societal forces that discourage judicial control of
contracts. 20 Still, the sliding scale approach has been utilized with
caution, evidencing that the increase in judicial intervention in contracts
has not run amuck. 21 For these reasons, the sliding scale approach, if
thoughtfully encouraged by scholars and carefully advanced by courts
and arbitrators, has the potential to empower decision makers to police
abuses in consumer contracts in both a balanced and politically
legitimate fashion. 22
This Article evaluates the sliding scale approach to
unconscionability, defends its use, and advocates for its continued and
expanded application to consumer standard form contracts. Part I
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a
Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 619–26 (2009); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes
about Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194–98
(2004). See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Part III.C.
20. See infra Part III.C.
21. See infra Part III.C.
22. See infra Part III.C.
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describes the sliding scale approach and its recent popularity in state
courts, thereby filling a gap in academic scholarship, which has to date
failed to fully examine this trend. Parts II and III defend the sliding
scale approach, praising its potential to align the unconscionability
analysis with interdisciplinary research regarding consumer decision
making and to balance formalist concerns about judicial regulation of
unfair terms in standard form contracts. Finally, Part IV calls for
calibrations to the sliding scale approach and its application to
standardized forms that will ensure its success as a protective device for
consumers.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF UNCONSCIONABILITY: THREE APPROACHES
The last decade brought an important qualitative change in the
doctrine of unconscionability and its application by courts.
Increasingly, courts are employing a sliding scale approach to
unconscionability that represents a significant transformation of, and
departure from, the traditional two-prong analysis, under which strong
evidence of both procedural and substantive unconscionability are
required to justify judicial interference with a contract. Since 2000,
twelve state supreme courts have either adopted or reaffirmed the
sliding scale approach. 23 Of these courts, five have further expanded
the sliding scale approach to hold that a finding of unconscionability
may rest on evidence of either procedural or substantive
unconscionability without requiring evidence of both. 24
The
23. See, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 572 (Cal. 2007); Razor v. Hyundai
Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 622 (Ill. 2006); Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 22
(Mo. 2010) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011) (mem.); Gonski v.
Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. ex rel. Washoe, 245 P.3d 1164, 1169–70 (Nev. 2010) (citing
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Nev. 2004)); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912
A.2d 104, 111 (N.J. 2006); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 907–08 (N.M.
2009); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 370 (N.C. 2008); Strand v.
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 924 (N.D. 2005); Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35
A.3d 1044, 1049 (Vt. 2011); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 782–83 (Wash. 2004) (en
banc); Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 289 (W. Va. 2011) (per
curiam), vacated on other grounds, Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201
(2012); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 164–65 (Wis. 2006).
24. See Razor, 854 N.E.2d at 622 (“Unconscionability can be either ‘procedural’ or
‘substantive’ or a combination of both.”); Brewer, 323 S.W.3d at 22 (“Under Missouri law,
unconscionability can be procedural, substantive or a combination of both.”); Cordova, 208 P.3d
at 908 (“While there is a greater likelihood of a contract’s being invalidated for unconscionability
if there is a combination of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, there is no
absolute requirement in our law that both must be present to the same degree or that they both be
present at all.”); Glassford, 35 A.3d at 1049 (citing Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540
A.2d 648, 652 (Vt. 1987)) (“The superior court was mistaken in assuming that the presence of
procedural unconscionability is required to void a contract based on it containing unconscionable
terms.”); Adler, 103 P.3d at 782 (“Substantive unconscionability alone can support a finding of
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significance of these decisions is underscored when one considers that
just over a decade ago some commentators declared unconscionability
to be “a relic” of contract law. 25 Against this backdrop, the recent swell
of state supreme court decisions reflects an important shift in judicial
thinking about consumer contracts and, more broadly, the judicial role
in policing these agreements. 26
Most major treatises acknowledge the sliding scale approach to
unconscionability and its variations as alternatives to the more
traditional unconscionability framework. 27 However, beyond bare
recognition, these alternatives to the traditional unconscionability
approach remain grossly under-analyzed. Little, if any, attention has
been given to how the courts endorsing the sliding scale approach apply
it, why those courts find the sliding scale attractive, and whether courts
consistently apply the doctrine. While the sliding scale approach has
been cursorily praised for strengthening the unconscionability
doctrine, 28 little to no explanation has been provided for why this
“vague[] mathematical metaphor” 29 might improve courts’ application
of unconscionability. Moreover, just as commentators have done little
more than acknowledge the increased popularity of the sliding scale, the
very courts employing this approach have failed to examine its merits.30
As a result, the sliding scale is inconsistently applied and poorly

unconscionability.”).
25. See generally, e.g., Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why
Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J. 287 (2000).
26. Some state supreme courts adopted the sliding scale approach much earlier than the last
decade. See, e.g., Helstrom v. N. Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192, 1200 (Alaska 1990). Further,
the sliding scale approach is utilized by appellate courts in several jurisdictions whose high courts
have yet to sanction the approach explicitly. See, e.g., State v. Wolowitz, 96 A.D.2d 47, 68 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983). The single-prong approach, too, has enjoyed limited support for decades. See,
e.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995); Am. Home Improvement, Inc.
v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 888–89 (N.H. 1964); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246, 254–
56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 948 (Or. Ct.
App. 2007); Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1043 (Utah
1985).
27. See, e.g., 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 10.7 (2d ed. 1993); E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH
ON CONTRACTS]; 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:9 (4th ed. 2011); 1–6
MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter MURRAY ON CONTRACTS]; JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.40 (6th ed. 2009); 1 LINDA J. RUSCH,
HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2:302:5 (2010); 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-7 (5th ed. 2000).
28. W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH CENTURY REFORMATION OF
CONTRACT LAW 142 (1996) [hereinafter SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES].
29. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1993).
30. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
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understood. The remainder of this Part first discusses the conventional
approach to unconscionability, and then explores the sliding scale in
detail, giving much needed attention to how courts apply the approach
and the justifications for its use.
A. The Conventional Approach
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) sanctioned the
doctrine of unconscionability in Article 2, but did not define the term or
establish a framework for its implementation. 31
The UCC’s
unconscionability provision—section 2-302—includes in its comments
a purported “test” for unconscionability: “[W]hether, in light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract.” 32 The official comments to section 2-302
explain in general terms that the doctrine seeks “the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise” and also directs against the “disturbance
of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.” 33 The
drafters of section 2-302 intentionally left the task of defining
unconscionability beyond these vague directives to the courts. 34 With
the assistance of contracts scholar Professor Arthur Leff, courts
employing section 2-302 quickly developed a two-part analytical
structure for the doctrine, which involves analysis of both “procedural”
and “substantive” unconscionability. 35
31. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 487–88 (1967).
32. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1952). Although UCC Article 2 was revised in 2003, no state has
yet adopted the revision. UCC section 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court finds the contract or any clause of the contract to be unconscionable it
may refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any unconscionable clauses and
enforce the contract as if the stricken clause had never existed.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the court may afford the parties an opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
Id. § 2-302.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts contains an unconscionability provision nearly identical
to UCC section 2-302. Section 208 of the Restatement provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
33. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
34. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 140.
35. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Leff,
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1. Procedural Unconscionability
Procedural unconscionability, or “bargaining naughtiness,” focuses
on the bargaining process itself. 36 Borrowing language from the
comments to section 2-302 of the UCC, courts look for evidence of
“oppression” and “unfair surprise” indicating that the transaction lacked
meaningful choice on the part of the complaining party. 37 The inquiry
focuses on specific and objective indicia demonstrating that a consumer
was unable to read and understand the terms of the agreement. 38 This
fact-intensive analysis involves a range of factors, both personal to the
individual consumer and present in the external contracting
environment. The age, literacy, and business sophistication of the party
claiming unconscionability are frequently taken into consideration, as
are the consumer’s level of education and socioeconomic status. 39 Any
“bad behavior” exhibited by the merchant is also relevant, including the
use of pressure tactics to obtain hasty signatures and the presence of
boilerplate language buried in small print. 40 Conversely, a merchant’s
“good behavior,” such as using simple and concise contractual language
or large, bolded typeface to call attention to important provisions,
militates against a finding of procedural unconscionability. 41
Recognizing that the disparity in bargaining power between
merchants and consumers often leaves consumers without an
opportunity to negotiate, many courts also consider whether the
contract is adhesionary as a relevant factor in the procedural

supra note 31, at 487.
36. Leff, supra note 31, at 487.
37. See LORD, supra note 27, § 18:10; PERILLO, supra note 27, § 9.40; WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 27, § 4-7. See also, e.g., Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co., 816 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.
1987) (finding no procedural unconscionability where the parties had a twenty-year course of
dealings, emphasizing that procedural unconscionability involves “oppression” and “unfair
surprise”).
38. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-3. See, e.g., Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano,
302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393–94 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (finding procedural unconscionability where plaintiff
had “at best a sketchy knowledge of the English language”).
39. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-3; Brown, supra note 25, at 298. See, e.g.,
Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ind. 1971) (finding procedural unconscionability
where plaintiff, a gas station operator, “had left high school after one and a half years and spent
his time . . . working at various skilled and unskilled labor oriented jobs”).
40. FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 4.28; Brown, supra note 25, at 297–98.
See, e.g., John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding
procedural unconscionability where the contract provisions contained complex “legalese” written
in fine print).
41. RUSCH, supra note 27, § 2-302:5. See also Bess v. DirecTV, Inc., 885 N.E.2d 488, 497–
98 (Ill App. Ct. 2008) (holding that the dispute resolution provision in the Customer Agreement,
which was printed in capital and boldface letters, did not support a finding of procedural
unconscionability).
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unconscionability analysis. 42 However, courts historically have been
unwilling to find the procedural prong satisfied by the mere fact that the
contract is a typical contract of adhesion.43 Thus, while recognizing
that an imbalance in bargaining power, the use of standard forms, and
lack of an opportunity to negotiate are all indications of procedural
unconscionability, most courts employing a conventional approach to
procedural unconscionability will not find a typical consumer form
contract, which meets these criteria, to be procedurally unconscionable
per se. 44 Rather, the existence of a form contract is one of many factors
taken into consideration by the court when addressing the possibility of
procedural unfairness. 45 By requiring additional evidence of procedural
unconscionability, the conventional approach takes into account the
practical utility and universality of consumer form contracts and
implicitly presumes their enforceability. 46 Only those form contracts
that suffer from additional procedural deficiencies will be subjected to
special scrutiny.
2. Substantive Unconscionability
Whereas procedural unconscionability targets the quality of the
consumer’s assent to the contract, substantive unconscionability targets
the content of the terms themselves by looking for unfairness in the
contract’s substantive provisions. 47 Here, the inquiry is centered on

42. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 96, at 547–49.
43. A contract of adhesion is generally defined as one drafted unilaterally by the party with
greater bargaining power and presented to the weaker party on a “take it or leave it basis.” Id. at
547 n.172.
44. See, e.g., Fields v. NCR Corp., 683 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (S.D. Iowa 2010) (“Given that
Plaintiff does not claim a lack of receipt of the [standard form policy], Plaintiff’s surprise at the
terms therein can hardly be characterized as ‘unfair.’”); Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho,
72 P.3d 877, 883 (Idaho 2003) (“[A]n adhesion contract cannot be held procedurally
unconscionable solely because there was no bargaining over the terms. Adhesion contracts are a
fact of modern life. They are not against public policy.”); 1 HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F.
CHASE, CONSUMER LAW SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 191 (1986) (“Form
contracts are not, of course, unconscionable per se.”); LORD, supra note 27, § 18:13 (“A form
contract will not generally be found unconscionable if there were negotiations on the essential
terms at issue, such as price.”).
45. See, e.g., Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Algona v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 619
(Iowa 1984) (“[A] finding that a contract is adhesive does not require a determination of
unconscionability. It merely alerts the court that the situation is one in which such a finding may
be justified.”). See also C&J Vantage Leasing Co. v. Wolfe, 795 N.W.2d 65, 80 (Iowa 2011)
(stating that “assent, unfair surprise, notice, disparity of bargaining power, and substantive
unfairness” are all relevant factors in assessing unconscionability).
46. See, e.g., Lovey, 72 P.3d at 883 (“Adhesion contracts are a fact of modern life.”); Hillman
& Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 461 (“The law presumes the general enforceability of standard
terms . . . .”).
47. See DOBBS, supra note 27, § 10.7.
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whether the allocation of risks in the contract or one of its terms is
commercially unreasonable or unexpectedly one-sided. 48 Scholars have
struggled to define the contours of substantive unconscionability with
precision; 49 they often describe the concept by listing the types of
clauses most commonly deemed substantively unconscionable.
Remedy limitations, penalty clauses, and price terms that impose a
significant cost-price disparity are typically cited as the most egregious
offenders. 50
The prevailing understanding is that courts will not invalidate a
provision as substantively unconscionable absent clear evidence of
extreme unfairness. 51 The standard parroted by most courts requires the
offending provision be one that “no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other,” a formulation that has remained unchanged
for 250 years. 52 Thus, according to the conventional view, the
offending provision must not merely be “unreasonable,” but must be
“harsh” or “oppressive” in nature, or the terms so one-sided as to “shock
the conscience.” 53
3. Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability Together
The conventional approach to unconscionability has been to
invalidate a contract or provision only when strong evidence of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability is present. 54 Specific
indications that a consumer lacked meaningful choice in the terms of the
contract are required to justify the court’s intervention in the ordering of
private affairs. Nevertheless, even when those indications are present, a
court may not “rewrite” the contract between the parties unless its
substantive unfairness is particularly egregious. 55
48. See PERILLO, supra note 27, § 9.40.
49. See, e.g., Warkentine, supra note 5, at 482 (stating that terms are substantively
unconscionable when they are either “harsh” or “one-sided”).
50. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-4; Brown, supra note 25, at 298–99; Larry A.
DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of
Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1079–80 (2006).
51. See White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 255–56; FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra
note 27, § 4.28.
52. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen [1750], 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch.). See Donald R. Price,
The Conscience of Judge and Jury: Statutory Unconscionability as a Mixed Question of Law and
Fact, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 743, 743 & n.2 (1981) (noting that since the eighteenth century, most courts
have parroted Webster’s Dictionary definition—“not guided or controlled by conscience”).
53. RUSCH, supra note 27, § 2-302:4.
54. LORD, supra note 27, § 18:10 (collecting cases); MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27,
§ 96(B)(2)(b) (collecting cases); RUSCH, supra note 27, § 2-302:5 (collecting cases).
55. See, e.g., Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 108 P.3d 332, 338 (Idaho 2005)
(“Courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more
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B. The Sliding Scale Approach
The sliding scale approach to unconscionability differs from the
conventional approach in a number of important ways. First, although
evidence of both procedural and substantive unconscionability are still
generally required before a court will invalidate an offending provision,
strong evidence of both prongs is no longer required to justify relief. 56
Second, courts have traditionally reviewed evidence of procedural and
substantive unconscionability separately, requiring a minimum
threshold or “quantum” of each type of unconscionability to justify
intervention in the contract. 57 In contrast, the sliding scale approach
does not require that procedural and substantive unconscionability each
be present in any particular degree; rather, a relatively large quantum of
one type of unconscionability can offset a relatively small quantum of
the other. 58 Thus, under the sliding scale approach, the two prongs are
viewed in tandem, permitting the court to make a finding of
unconscionability if the overall weight of the facts and circumstances
favors intervention. 59
equitable. Equity may intervene to change the terms of a contract if the unconscionable conduct
is serious enough to justify the court’s interference.”).
56. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)
(“The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present
in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the
doctrine of unconscionability . . . . But they need not be present in the same degree.”); Gonski v.
Second Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. ex rel. Washoe, 245 P.3d 1164, 1169 (Nev. 2010) (“Although
a showing of both types of unconscionability is necessary before an arbitration clause will be
invalidated . . . a strong showing of procedural unconscionability mean[s] that less substantive
unconscionability [is] required.” (citing D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Nev.
2004))); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111 (N.J. 2006) (“Courts generally have
applied a sliding-scale approach to determine overall unconscionability, considering the relative
levels of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.”); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of
N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 908 (N.M. 2009) (“While there is a greater likelihood of a contract’s being
invalidated for unconscionability if there is a combination of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability, there is no absolute requirement in our law that both must be present to the
same degree or that they both be present at all.”); Brown ex rel. v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724
S.E.2d 250, 289 (W. Va. 2011) (per curiam) (“We perceive a contract term is unenforceable if it
is both procedural and substantively unconscionable. However, both need not be present to the
same degree. Courts should apply a ‘sliding scale’ . . . .”), vacated on other grounds, Marmet
Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
57. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 142.
58. FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 4.28; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27,
§ 4-7.
59. See, e.g., Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 352 (Ct. App.
1999) (“Although both elements must be present before a contract or contract provision is
rendered unenforceable on grounds of unconscionability, they are reviewed in tandem such that
‘the greater the degree of substantive unconscionability, the less the degree of procedural
unconscionability that is required to annul the contract or clause.’” (quoting Carboni v. Arrospide,
2 Cal. Rptr. 845, 849 (Ct. App. 1991))). See also Gonski, 245 P.3d at 1169 (“[A] strong showing
of procedural unconscionability meant that less substantive unconscionability was required. The
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Because the unconscionability analysis—under any approach—
remains a fact-intensive inquiry, generalizations about the doctrine are
difficult to make. However, careful study of unconscionability
jurisprudence points toward the conclusion that the sliding scale
approach amounts to a relaxation in the application of the traditional
unconscionability analysis. This relaxation applies to each prong of the
two-part framework and to the ultimate finding of unconscionability as
a whole.
1. The Procedural Prong
First, the sliding scale approach to unconscionability represents some
courts’ willingness to make an overall finding of unconscionability on
the basis of relatively limited evidence supporting the procedural prong.
Significantly, some courts employing the sliding scale approach view
the mere existence of a consumer contract of adhesion as sufficient to
satisfy the procedural unconscionability prong without additional
indicia of deficient assent. For example, courts in California, where the
sliding scale approach has been utilized for some time, are generally
willing to find procedural unconscionability established by the existence
of a typical standard form contract. 60 Courts in other jurisdictions,

reverse is true also . . . .” (citing D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Nev. 2004)));
Delta Funding Corp., 912 A.2d at 111 (“Courts generally have applied a sliding-scale approach
to determine overall unconscionability, considering the relative levels of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability.”); Cordova, 208 P.3d at 908 (“Procedural and substantive
unconscionability often have an inverse relationship. The more substantively oppressive a
contract term, the less procedural unconscionability may be required for the court to conclude that
the offending term is unenforceable.”); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d
362, 370 (N.C. 2008) (“The presence of both procedural and substantive problems is necessary
for an ultimate finding of unconscionability, such a finding may be appropriate when a contract
presents pronounced substantive unfairness and a minimal degree of procedural unfairness, or
vice versa.”); Brown, 724 S.E.2d at 289 (“[C]ourts should apply a sliding scale in making this
determination: the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of
procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the clause is
unenforceable, and vice versa.”); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 165
(Wis. 2006) (“A determination of unconscionability requires a mixture of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability that is analyzed on a case-by-case basis. The more substantive
unconscionability present, the less procedural unconscionability is required, and vice versa.”).
The sliding scale approach is also termed the “balancing approach” because of this weighting
feature. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-7.
60. See, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 572 (Cal. 2007) (“The procedural
element of an unconscionable contract generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion, ‘which,
imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing
party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’” (quoting Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005), overruled on other grounds by AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011))).
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including New Jersey 61 and North Dakota, 62 have taken a similar
approach. Thus, unlike the conventional approach, under which the
enforceability of form contracts is strongly presumed, in these states the
sliding scale potentially allows for a more lenient test of procedural
unconscionability.
Finding that procedural unconscionability is
established by the mere existence of a form contract could permit the
court to turn to the question of substantive unconscionability without
becoming mired in details, such as the appearance of the contract, the
educational level of the consumer, or whether the consumer had
sufficient time to review and consider the contractual provisions. 63
This relaxed approach to procedural unconscionability reflects what
the drafters had in mind when the doctrine was first incorporated into
the UCC. Indeed, a celebrated pre-UCC decision, Campbell Soup Co.
v. Wentz, employed a sliding scale approach and was cited in the official
comments to section 2-302 as an exemplar of the doctrine. 64 In Wentz,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce a contract it found
to be “too hard a bargain and too one-sided an agreement to entitle the
plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience.” 65 The court’s holding in
Wentz was based almost entirely on the fairness of the substantive
provisions of the contract, while the only discussion of “procedural”
fairness was a bare statement that the contract was a preprinted form
contract supplied by the defendant. 66
Not all courts, however, address the sliding scale approach in the
same manner. Therefore, the willingness to find consumer contracts of
adhesion procedurally unconscionable as a matter of course is not
uniformly observed. Some courts employing the sliding scale approach
61. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 96–97 (N.J.
2006) (“The determination that a contract is one of adhesion, however, ‘is the beginning, not the
end, of the inquiry’ . . . . A sharpened inquiry concerning unconscionability is necessary when a
contract of adhesion is involved.” (quoting Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n,
605 A.2d 681, 686 (N.J. 1992))); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111 (N.J. 2006)
(“This Court has recognized that contracts of adhesion necessarily involve indicia of procedural
unconscionability.”). But see Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 1 A.3d 678, 687 (N.J. 2010)
(“Although a contract of adhesion may require one party to choose either to accept or reject the
contract as is, the agreement nevertheless may be enforced.”).
62. See Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 925 (N.D. 2005) (“When one
party is in such a superior bargaining position that it totally dictates all terms of the contract and
the only option presented to the other party is to take it or leave it, some quantum of procedural
unconscionability is established. The party who drafts such a contract of adhesion bears the
responsibility of assuring that the provisions of the contract are not so one-sided as to be
unconscionable.”).
63. Delta Funding Corp., 912 A.2d at 111.
64. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1952).
65. 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948).
66. Id. at 83.
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refuse to find adhesionary contracts per se unconscionable, demanding
additional, specific evidence that the consumer did not have a
meaningful opportunity to read and understand the contract. These
courts may scrutinize the age, socioeconomic status, and sophistication
of the complaining party and scour the contracting environment for
evidence of pressure tactics. 67 Other courts continue to require
evidence of procedural defects that rise almost to the level of fraud or
duress before finding the procedural unconscionability prong
satisfied. 68 Courts that continue to apply the procedural prong with
specificity defend the practice on the ground that a lessened standard of
procedural unconscionability would result in the invalidation of too
many contracts. As the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
[Contracts of adhesion] are a fact of modern life. Consumers routinely
sign such agreements to obtain credit cards, rental cars, land and
cellular telephone service, home furnishings and appliances, loans,
and other products and services. It cannot reasonably be said that all
such contracts are so procedurally unconscionable as to be
unenforceable. 69

Additionally, some courts have found that objective indications that a
consumer enjoyed an opportunity to read and understand the contract
could serve to insulate a contract of adhesion from procedural
unconscionability. 70 For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
which adopted the sliding scale approach in 2006, 71 recently held in
Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises, LLC that a “fairly typical adhesion
67. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. High Point Healthcare Inc., 721 S.E.2d 712, 717 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2012) (noting that the plaintiff was an “ordinary consumer” and the defendant a
“sophisticated health care services provider”); Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp.,
724 S.E.2d 250, 285 (W. Va. 2011) (per curium) (finding that procedural unconscionability
involves a variety of inadequacies, such as “literacy, lack of sophistication, hidden or unduly
complex contract terms, bargaining tactics, and the particular setting” (quoting Muhammad v.
Cnty. Bank, 912 A.2d 88, 96 (N.J. 2006))), vacated on other grounds, Marmet Health Care Ctr.,
Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
68. See, e.g., Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 784 (Wash. 2004) (“If [defendant’s]
representative threatened to fire [plaintiff] for refusing to sign the agreement despite the fact that
[plaintiff] raised concerns with its terms or indicated a lack of understanding, the manner of the
transaction would lend support to [plaintiff’s] claim of procedural unconscionability . . . .
However, if as [defendant] contends, [its representative] explained the document and/or offered to
answer [plaintiff’s] concerns or questions, such facts will not lend support to [plaintiff’s] claim of
procedural unconscionability.”).
69. Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 266 (Ill. 2006).
70. See, e.g., Dotson v. Amgen, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 341, 346–47 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding a
“minimal” degree of procedural unconscionability where the employment contract was a contract
of adhesion but was written in clear language, arbitration was stated in bold numerous times as a
condition of employment, and the employee was a highly educated attorney who was not “rushed
or coerced”).
71. See Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111 (N.J. 2006).
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contract” could not be found procedurally unconscionable where the
complaining consumer had ample time to review and consider the
contractual provisions and could have contracted elsewhere for the same
services with less onerous terms. 72 Stelluti represents a shift in the law
in New Jersey. Just four years earlier in Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris,
the same court held that the fact that a contract was a consumer contract
of adhesion was “sufficient” to find the contract procedurally
unconscionable, concluding that the resolution of “certain [disputed]
facts surrounding [plaintiff’s] signing of the contract that suggest[ed] a
high level of procedural unconscionability” was unnecessary. 73
2. The Substantive Prong
Many courts employing the sliding scale approach have also visibly
relaxed the strict requirements for substantive unconscionability.
Where courts once routinely required “conscience-shocking” or
“outrageous” unfairness to support a finding of substantive
unconscionability, courts employing a sliding scale increasingly look to
whether the terms are “unreasonably one-sided” or “commercially
unreasonable.” 74
In rejecting the conventional standard of
unconscionability—“‘such as no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other’” 75—the New Mexico Supreme Court noted
that “[t]he repetition of this unhelpful terminology from a bygone age
only serves to confuse the unconscionability issues without serving any
constructive purpose.” 76 The Illinois Supreme Court recently rejected a
similarly “demanding” standard that the offending provision must be
“‘grossly one-sided’” such that “‘only one under delusion’” would agree
to it, calling such descriptions “under inclusive.” 77
72. Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., 1 A.3d 678, 688 (N.J. 2010).
73. 912 A.2d at 111. This change in approach may be explained by differences in the facts of
the two cases. Unlike the plaintiff in Stelluti, the plaintiff in Delta Funding was described as “a
seventy-eight-year-old woman with only a sixth-grade education and little financial
sophistication.” Id. at 108.
74. See, e.g., Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 898 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting
that substantively unconscionable contracts can be generally characterized as one-sided); Kinkel,
857 N.E.2d at 267 (citing Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d 607, 622 (Ill. 2006)) (same);
Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 908 (N.M. 2009) (“Contract provisions that
unreasonably benefit one party over another are substantively unconscionable.”); Wis. Auto Title
Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 166 (Wis. 2006) (explaining that analyzing
unconscionability requires looking at the terms of the agreement and determining whether it is
unconscionable).
75. Cordova, 208 P.3d at 909 (citing Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889)).
76. Id. at 910.
77. Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d at 268–69 (quoting Basselen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 792 N.E.2d 498,
507 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)); In re Estate of Croake, 578 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991),
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Clear relaxation of the substantive unconscionability standard is not,
however, a universal feature of the sliding scale approach. Some courts
continue to require evidence of substantive unconscionability to meet a
very high threshold, even while simultaneously embracing the sliding
scale approach and touting its flexibility. 78 For example, one recent
California appellate court specifically reaffirmed that the appropriate
standard for substantive unconscionability involves “harsh” or
“oppressive” terms that “shock the conscience,” adding that “[t]he
phrases ‘harsh,’ ‘oppressive,’ and ‘shock the conscience’ are not
synonymous with ‘unreasonable.’” 79 According to the court, a
substantive unconscionability inquiry based on mere reasonableness
“would inject an inappropriate level of judicial subjectivity into the
analysis.” 80 Another court, taking a similar approach, explained that the
more conventional formulations of substantive unconscionability are
preferable to a reasonableness standard because they are “more specific,
more exacting, and more demanding . . . .” 81
Additionally, courts that have applied a relaxed standard of
substantive unconscionability have not clearly done so as a consequence
of the sliding scale approach. On the one hand, the increased
willingness of some courts to address the reasonableness of contractual
provisions may simply reflect that some courts are more inclined to
intervene in adhesive contracts on behalf of consumers, regardless of
the particular approach to unconscionability applicable in a given
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the recognition that “unreasonable”
commercial behavior is sufficiently substantively unconscionable to
justify the invalidation of a particular provision is perfectly consistent
with a sliding scale or balancing approach to the doctrine. Provided that
clear evidence of procedural defects in the contracting process is
present, “unreasonable” commercial behavior may be egregious enough
to tip the scale in favor of an overall finding that the contract is
unconscionable.
3. The Two Prongs in Tandem
In theory, the most salient feature of the sliding scale approach is that
it permits courts to view substantive and procedural unconscionability

overruled by Kinkel, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006).
78. See, e.g., Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2002) (“The second factor—substantive unconscionability—simply suggests the exchange of
obligations so one-sided as to shock the court’s conscience.”).
79. Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 809 (Ct. App. 2005).
80. Id.
81. Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 402 (Ct. App. 1994).
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“in tandem” rather than independent of one another, so that a greater
quantity of one type of unconscionability could “make up” for a smaller
quantity of the other. 82 Thus, one would expect courts that find
procedural unconscionability based on scant evidence to require very
strong evidence of substantive unconscionability in order to make an
overall finding that a contractual provision is invalid. Conversely, when
a contract contains unfair substantive provisions but falls short of
“conscience-shocking,” one might expect the court to require more
extreme evidence of involuntary choice before invalidating the
offending provision. 83
In practice, however, courts seldom apply the sliding scale approach
with this type of precision. Rather, most courts that espouse the sliding
scale approach provide a brief description of its theoretical framework,
then perform a fact-specific inquiry without ever engaging in any
meaningful discussion of how the relative weight of each prong factors
into the overall determination of unconscionability. 84 Moreover, courts
have provided little explanation as to why a balancing approach to
unconscionability represents an improvement in the application of the
doctrine. Courts that favor the balancing method tend to defer to the
“trend” without further discussion, 85 while others explain merely that
the approach is supported by “a good deal of sense” given the
“‘amorphous’” nature of the doctrine of unconscionability. 86
82. See supra note 59 (listing several cases that treat substantive and procedural
unconscionability in practice).
83. See, e.g., Dotson v. Amgen, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 341, 346–47 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding
“minimal” procedural unconscionability and thus requiring a correspondingly “high” degree of
substantive unconscionability).
84. See, e.g., Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 165–76 (Wis. 2006)
(concluding curiously, after extensive discussion of each prong, that “there is a sufficient
quantum of both procedural and substantive unconscionability to render the arbitration provision
invalid”). But see Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int’l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 634–36
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (performing a sliding scale analysis after analyzing each prong
independently).
85. See, e.g., Helstrom v. N. Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192, 1200 (Alaska 1990) (electing to
follow the sliding scale approach set out in the Restatement); Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, Inc.,
323 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Mo. 2010) (“Under Missouri law unconscionability can be procedural,
substantive or a combination of both.”), vacated on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011)
(mem.); Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 908 (N.M. 2009) (“The more
substantively oppressive a contract term, the less procedural unconscionability may be required
for a court to conclude the offending term is enforceable.”); State v. Wolowitz, 468 N.Y.S.2d
131, 145 (App. Div. 1983) (“Generally, there must be a showing of both lack of a meaningful
choice and the presence of contract terms that unreasonably favor one party.”); Wis. Auto, 714
N.W.2d at 165 (defining unconscionability as, “the absence of a meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties, together with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other
party”).
86. See, e.g., Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 922–23 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
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C. The Single-Prong Approach
As the sliding scale approach to unconscionability has gained
popularity, a growing minority of courts have applied a “single-prong”
approach to the doctrine, under which extreme evidence of one type of
unconscionability alone is used to justify an overall finding of
unconscionability, without inquiry into the second prong. 87 This
variation represents a significantly more liberal application of the
doctrine. Just as the sliding scale approach remains largely unexplored
by both commentators and courts, the merit, utility, and theoretical
underpinnings of the single-prong approach are also almost entirely
undeveloped, even as additional jurisdictions embrace it. Careful study
of the single-prong approach—both its rhetoric and its actual
application by courts—reveals that even though the single-prong
approach has the potential to transform the doctrine of
unconscionability, it is narrowly applied by modern courts.
1. Substantive Unconscionability Alone
First, using the single-prong approach, a number of courts have
premised an overall finding of unconscionability on the basis of
substantive unfairness alone. A well-known example is Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., in which a New York state court found an
arbitration provision contained in several standard form computer and
software sales agreements substantively, though not procedurally,
unconscionable.88 According to the court, “[w]hile it is true that, under
New York law, unconscionability is generally predicated on the
presence of both the procedural and substantive elements, the
substantive element alone may be sufficient to render the terms of the
provision at issue unenforceable.” 89 Although Brower has been
criticized for its extreme application of the unconscionability doctrine, 90
other courts have similarly found contract terms unconscionable on the
basis of substantive unconscionability alone. 91 Thus, while the
2002) (citing Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 651 (N.J. 1971)).
87. See supra note 24 (citing state supreme court decisions that adopted a single-prong
approach).
88. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574–75 (App. Div. 1998).
89. Id. at 574.
90. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Ethical Considerations in Drafting and Enforcing Consumer
Arbitration Clauses, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 841, 859–60 (2008) (criticizing Brower for electing not
to enforce the provision requiring arbitration before the ICC); Leon E. Trakman, The Boundaries
of Contract Law in Cyberspace, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 187, 199–200 (2008) (“[T]he contract gave
the plaintiffs an ‘unqualified right’ within thirty days of purchase ‘to return the merchandise
because the goods or terms are unsatisfactory or for no reason at all.’”).
91. See, e.g., Helstrom v. N. Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192, 1200 (Alaska 1990) (holding that
a liquidated damages clause was unenforceable based upon substantive unconscionability alone);
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substantive unconscionability-alone approach was exceptional just two
decades ago, 92 courts employ it more commonly today.
However, the substantive unconscionability-only approach is limited
in its breadth, as it is generally employed in cases involving excessive
pricing 93 or extreme limitation of remedies clauses, 94 most recently in
the form of arbitration provisions 95 and class action bans. 96
State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006) (noting that if a court
determines a contract, or any particular clause of the contract, to have been unconscionable at the
time the contract was made, the court may find the contract or that particular term unenforceable);
Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 910 (N.M. 2009) (holding that the
arbitration provisions of a contract were so substantively one-sided that the court did not consider
procedural unconscionability before declaring the provisions unenforceable); Fiser v. Dell
Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. 2008) (holding a contract substantively
unconscionable and unenforceable without considering the procedural history of the contract);
Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 786–88 (Wash. 2004) (ordering the trial court to
require further discovery regarding substantive unconscionability upon remand).
92. See Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit
Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 942 n.14 (1986) (reporting that (at the time of the article),
“[s]ince 1971, no court has declared a contract unconscionable solely on substantive
unconscionability grounds”).
93. See, e.g., Toker v. Perl, 247 A.2d 701, 703 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (“It is the
opinion of the court that the exorbitant price of the freezer makes the contract unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable.”); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (Dist. Ct. 1966)
(“The court finds that the sale of the appliance at the price and terms indicated in this contract is
shocking to the conscience.”), rev’d on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term 1967);
Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 541 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (“To charge them
$67,000 for carvings worth less than half that amount is unconscionable.”); Jones v. Star Credit
Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (“[T]he sale of a refrigerator costing $348 for $900
plus credit charges of $245.88 was unconscionable as a matter of law.”); Toker v. Westerman,
274 A.2d 78, 81 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to receive reasonable
profit from the sale of a good); Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886, 889
(N.H. 1964) (holding a contract unconscionable that required a payment of $1,609 “for goods and
services valued at far less”). These price-disparity cases have “dwindled to a trickle” over time.
See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-5.
94. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-6 (noting that “remedy meddling” can take many
forms, including liquidated damages clauses, limitations on consequential damages, and warranty
disclaimers).
95. See, e.g., Cordova, 208 P.3d at 910 (“Applying the settled standard of New Mexico
unconscionability law, we conclude that World Finance’s self-serving arbitration scheme it
imposed on its borrowers is so unfairly and unreasonably one-sided that it is substantively
unconscionable.”); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (App. Div. 1998)
(upholding an arbitration clause as enforceable).
96. See, e.g., Fiser, 188 P.3d at 1221 (finding a New Mexico law on class actions bans
unconscionable for contravening public policy). The U.S Supreme Court’s recent ruling in AT&T
Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), seriously curtails the use of the
unconscionability doctrine to strike down arbitration agreements containing class action waivers.
In Concepcion, the Court overturned Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal.
2005), a California Supreme Court decision holding class action bans in arbitration agreements
unconscionable under state law. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750. The Court held that Discover
Bank was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act because it “interfere[d] with arbitration” by
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Additionally, the majority approach still requires some showing of
procedural unconscionability, however small, in order to justify
invalidating an offending provision. 97
2. Procedural Unconscionability Alone
Most courts have not expanded the sliding scale approach to find
unconscionability on the basis of procedural unconscionability alone.
Although a number of courts have suggested that procedural
unconscionability alone would suffice, 98 very few courts have actually
invalidated contracts on the basis of purely procedural defects.99
Indeed, several courts have rejected the possibility that an overall
finding of unconscionability could rest on procedural deficiencies
alone. 100 Other courts, though embracing the single-prong approach as
permitting “any party to a consumer contract to demand [classwide arbitration].” Id. For an
excellent discussion of the ramifications of Concepcion, including the potential limitations on the
Court’s ruling, see Michael A. Helfand, Purpose, Precedent, and Politics: Why Concepcion
Covers Less than You Think, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION (forthcoming 2012).
97. See, e.g., Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 573 (Cal. 2007) (“The logical
conclusion is that a court would have no basis under common law unconscionability analysis to
scrutinize or overturn even the most unfair or exculpatory of contractual terms.”), overruled by
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), and Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372
(Ct. App. 2012); Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229,
1251 (D.C. 1990) (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965)) (noting that establishing unconscionability requires both that one party lacked a
“meaningful choice” and that the contract’s terms favor the other party); Kinkel v. Cingular
Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 265 (Ill. 2006) (citing Razor v. Hyundai Motor Am., 854 N.E.2d
607, 622 (Ill. 2006)) (noting that a court will likely find a contract to be unconscionable in a
consumer context where bargaining power is unequal and “the consequential damages clause is
on a pre-printed form”); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 923–24 (N.D.
2005) (holding that both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present for a term
or contract to be deemed unenforceable); Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724
S.E.2d 250, 285 (W. Va. 2011) (per curium) (“Under West Virginia law, we analyze
unconscionability in terms of two component parts: procedural unconscionability and substantive
unconscionability.”), vacated on other grounds, Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.
Ct. 1201 (2012); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 164 (Wis. 2006) (“A
determination of unconscionability requires a mixture of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.”).
98. See, e.g., Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 409–10 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980) (“Unconscionability can be either procedural or substantive or a combination of
both.”).
99. See, e.g., E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 717 (Miss. 2002) (“Because we find that
the arbitration clause in this case is procedurally unconscionable, we find it unnecessary to
address [plaintiff’s] . . . arguments regarding substantive unconscionability.”).
100. See, e.g., Commc’ns Maint., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 761 F.2d 1202, 1210 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding a contract enforceable after analyzing only substantive unconscionability); NEC Techs.,
Inc. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 773 n.6 (Ga. 1996) (quoting Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464
So. 2d 626, 629 (D.C. Fla. 1985)) (explaining that courts require a certain quantum of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability); Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., 1 A.3d 678, 687 n.10
(N.J. 2010) (“[A] finding of a high level of procedural unconscionability alone may not render an
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applied to substantive unconscionability, remain agnostic on the issue of
whether procedural unconscionability suffices to justify judicial
intervention. 101
3. Justifications for the Single-Prong Approach
The single-prong approach to unconscionability is in no way novel.
Indeed, in the seminal case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., the court alluded to the possibility that substantive
unconscionability alone may suffice to invalidate a contract. 102 The
official commentary to the Restatement’s unconscionability provision
likewise recognizes the validity of such an approach in exceptional
circumstances, 103 as do some primary contracts treatises. 104 But the
theoretical justifications for the single-prong approach remain largely
unexplored. The most significant expositions of the single-prong
approach have been conducted by courts rather than commentators,
although most courts that have embraced a single-prong approach have
failed to explicitly provide any grounds for doing so. 105
According to one explanation, the existence of especially severe
substantive unconscionability implies deficiencies in assent. In other
words, if the terms of the contract are extremely one-sided in favor of
the merchant, it must be presumed that the consumer lacked either
knowledge of, or meaningful choice with respect to, the contractual
provisions; otherwise, the consumer would not have agreed to the
entire agreement unenforceable.”); Carey v. Lincoln Loan Co., 125 P.3d 814, 828 (Or. Ct. App.
2005) (“The primary focus, however, appears to be relatively clear: substantial disparity in
bargaining power combined with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the party with the
greater power may result in a contract or contractual provision being unconscionable.”).
101. See, e.g., Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 782 (“[S]ince Adler has yet to prove a
valid claim of procedural unconscionability, we decline to consider whether it alone will support
a claim of unconscionability.”).
102. 350 F.2d 445, 449 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[A] one-sided bargain is itself evidence of the
inequality of the bargaining parties.”). See SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at
142–43.
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (1981) (“Theoretically, it is
possible for a contract to be oppressive taken as a whole, even though there is no weakness in the
bargaining process and no single term which is in itself unconscionable. Ordinarily, however, an
unconscionable contract involves other factors as well as an overall imbalance.”).
104. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-4, at 158 (“[S]ubstantive
unconscionability alone can be enough.”); MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, §
96[B][2][b], at 557 (“Other courts are not convinced that both types [of unconscionability] are
necessary.”).
105. See, e.g., Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1048–49 (Vt. 2011) (“The superior
court was mistaken in assuming that the presence of procedural unconscionability is required to
void a contract based on it containing unconscionable terms.”); Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 540 A.2d 648, 652 (Vt. 1987) (holding a contract unenforceable despite not finding
the formation of the contract procedurally unconscionable).
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prejudicial terms. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court, in holding
that the substantive unconscionability of a loan agreement was serious
enough to justify non-enforcement of its provisions, explained that
“[t]he apparent injustice and oppression of these security provisions not
only may constitute substantive unconscionability but also may provide
evidence of procedural unconscionability.” 106 From this perspective,
the single-prong approach is simply the sliding scale approach in
disguise: both procedural and substantive deficiencies are factored into
the determination of a contract’s validity, but only one type of
deficiency is immediately apparent. In this way, the single-prong
approach may be viewed as an extension of the sliding scale approach
rather than a distinct approach to the doctrine.
According to another view, the two prongs are viewed as distinct in
their content, but extreme evidence of substantive unconscionability is
simply not to be tolerated, even in the absence of procedural
deficiencies. Here, substantive oppression is enough to invalidate a
provision, and no implication of procedural unfairness is required.
Thus, one Florida appellate court reasoned:
“[W]here it is perfectly plain to the court that one party . . . has
overreached the other and has gained an unjust and undeserved
advantage which it would be inequitable to permit him to enforce, . . .
a court of equity will not hesitate to interfere, even though the
victimized parties owe their predicament largely to their own stupidity
and carelessness.” 107

This approach views the courts’ role as one of policing the outer limits
of contractual fairness and is reserved for the most egregious cases of
overreaching.
At least one court, in defending the substantive unconscionabilityalone approach, has equated the continued requirement of procedural
unconscionability with excessive formalism on the part of courts and
commentators.
According to the Arizona Supreme Court, the
procedural/substantive dichotomy is “based more on the historical
reluctance of courts to disturb contracts than on valid doctrinal
underpinning.” 108 The court also observed that nothing in the text of
the UCC suggests requiring a finding of procedural unconscionability
and further pointed out that section 2-317 of the UCC, which provides
for the unconscionability of contractual provisions limiting
106. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 60 (Ariz. 1995) (citing DOBBS, supra note
27, § 10.7, at 706–07).
107. Hialeah Auto., LLC v. Basulto, 22 So. 3d 586, 592 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(quoting Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So. 2d 884, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
108. Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 59.
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consequential damages for injury to the person, contemplates a finding
of unconscionability on the basis of substantive unconscionability
alone. 109
Although courts that explicitly reject the substantive
unconscionability-alone approach have rarely provided any clear
reasons for doing so, the most plausible explanation for requiring
evidence of procedural unconscionability is that some deficiency in the
parties’ assent is needed to justify judicial intervention in the private
ordering of affairs. In rejecting a single-prong approach, the California
Supreme Court has explained:
[A] conclusion that a contract contains no element of procedural
unconscionability is tantamount to saying that, no matter how onesided the contract terms, a court will not disturb the contract because
of its confidence that the contract was negotiated or chosen freely, that
the party subject to a seemingly one-sided term is presumed to have
obtained some advantage from conceding the term or that, if one party
negotiated poorly, it is not the court’s place to rectify these kinds of
errors or asymmetries. 110

In other words, courts should not engage in any assessment of the
substantive fairness of freely negotiated contracts.
The merits of a procedural unconscionability-alone approach to
standard contracts remain even more mysterious. A handful of
commentators have defended the possibility that procedural deficiencies
could be severe enough to justify relief in the absence of substantive
unfairness.
According to these writers, extreme procedural
unconscionability undermines consent in the same manner as fraud or
duress and thus should not be tolerated. 111 However, recognizing that
the bulk of consumer contracts today are not freely negotiated, most
courts and scholars maintain that invalidating contracts on procedural
foundations alone would produce so much instability in the marketplace
as to be counterproductive. 112 Moreover, there are practical barriers to
a procedural unconscionability-alone approach. Most significantly,
unless the substantive rights of a party are involved, the validity of the
109. Id.
110. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 573 (Cal. 2007), overruled by AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), and Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d
372 (Ct. App. 2012).
111. See SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 143; Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 796 (2004)
[hereinafter Stempel, Equilibrium] (“Logic would appear to support a role for procedural
unconscionability standing alone.”).
112. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 796 (“One at least hopes that most courts would
not take a ‘no harm, no foul’ approach to such procedural abuses.”).
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contract is unlikely to be litigated. As one court observed, “No matter
how the contract came about, it would be unlikely that a party would
complain—or a court would listen—if the contract was otherwise fair or
reasonable.” 113
D. The Promise of the Sliding Scale
The conventional wisdom is that most courts employ some variation
of the sliding scale approach when addressing unconscionability
claims. 114 As the above description makes clear, however, the sliding
scale approach is far from settled law. 115 While courts in a majority of
states have explicitly adopted a sliding scale approach, a number of
jurisdictions have not clearly espoused this more flexible version of the
unconscionability doctrine. 116 Furthermore, a minority of courts
continue to utilize the conventional two-prong approach to
unconscionability, even while an opposed, but growing, minority have
embraced a single-prong approach to the doctrine.
Conflict rages within individual jurisdictions as well. For example,
the uncertain state of the sliding scale approach was recently revealed
by an Eleventh Circuit decision certifying whether Florida law
recognized the doctrine and, if so, whether unconscionability could be
based upon substantive unconscionability alone. 117 The court observed
that Florida appellate jurisprudence is divided, with some courts
explicitly rejecting the sliding scale, 118 others endorsing it while

113. Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 921 n.13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2002). See Paul Bennett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damages Clause: A
Practical Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 50 n.37 (2001) (“If an
otherwise fair and just agreement is entered into as a result of procedural irregularities, an
overreaching for example, one wonders—so what?”).
114. See supra note 27 (citing major contracts treatises that discuss the prevalence of the
sliding scale approach).
115. See Sitogum, 800 A.2d at 921–22 (noting disagreement among jurisdictions); Maxwell v.
Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) (same). See also Stempel, Equilibrium, supra
note 111, at 795 (noting that some cases require both forms of unconscionability while others
only require one).
116. For example, the supreme courts of Alabama and Indiana have yet to consider a sliding
scale or balancing approach to unconscionability, though the jurisprudence of these states suggest
that a conventional approach is preferred. See, e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. v. Rigas, 923
So. 2d 1077, 1086–87 (Ala. 2005); DiMizio v. Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018, 1023–24 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001).
117. Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1133–34 (11th Cir. 2010).
118. Id. at 1134 (citing Bland v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 927 So. 2d 252, 257 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006)); see Mobile Am. Corp. v. Howard, 307 So. 2d 507, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (“Of those cases dealing with price at all, most require, in addition to a grossly excessive
price, some element of nondisclosure, fraud, overreaching, or manifestly unequal bargaining
position.”) (emphasis omitted)).
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rejecting a single-prong approach, 119 and a third camp explicitly finding
that substantive unconscionability alone will not suffice. 120 The Florida
Supreme Court has declined to reconcile the conflict. 121 Showing
similar disagreement, the Ohio Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its
adherence to the conventional approach to unconscionability 122 over the
vigorous objection of a dissenting member. 123
The continued multiplicity of approaches to unconscionability is
unsurprising given that the rationales for the sliding scale and singleprong approaches remain largely undefined. Moreover, it remains
unclear whether courts consider the single-prong approach as an
extension of the sliding scale approach or a stand-alone application of
the doctrine. However, the failure of courts and commentators to fully
explain the motivations behind the evolving approaches to
unconscionability should not lead to a conclusion that these approaches
cannot be justified. On the contrary, a sliding scale approach to
unconscionability can be defended both for its potential to align the
unconscionability analysis with interdisciplinary research regarding
consumer behavior and for its capacity to balance formalist concerns
about judicial regulation with the need for judicial oversight of unfair
terms in standard form contracts.
II. SOLVING THE DILEMMA OF ASSENT
Although scholars disagree fiercely about the appropriate solution to
the problems posed by standardized forms, there is little doubt that the
treatment of standard contracts is one of the most important puzzles
facing modern contract law 124—and perhaps one of the most
difficult. 125
119. Pendergast, 592 F.3d at 1134 (citing Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
120. Id. at 1134 (citing Nat’l Fin. Servs., LLC v. Mahan, 19 So. 3d 1134, 1136–37 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2009); see Belcher v. Kier, 558 So. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that appellees did not establish both unconscionability prongs).
121. See Pendergast v. Spring Nextel Corp., No. SC10-19, 2012 WL 2948594, at *1 (Fla. July
17, 2012).
122. Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ohio 2009).
123. See id. at 420–21 (Pfeiffer, J., dissenting) (advocating for a sliding scale approach).
124. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 5, at 362 (“[F]ew ‘private’ law
problems . . . remotely rival the[ir] importance . . . .”); Scott J. Burnham, Incorporating the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Article 2, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 217, 217 (2009) (“The
greatest problem facing modern contract law is how to deal with the contract of adhesion.”). See
also Warkentine, supra note 5, at 485 (noting the recent resurgence of scholarly interest in
standard form contracts).
125. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 2, at 229 (“[T]here is no uniform line of thought regarding
the appropriate treatment of [standard form] contracts.”); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion:
An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176 (1983) [hereinafter Rakoff, Adhesion]
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Standard form contracts pervade the consumer arena. 126 The
proliferation of standard agreements follows their indispensable
character—the mass production and distribution of goods, software, and
services render form contracts vital to the continued functioning of the
economy. 127 By their very nature, standard form contracts are intended
for repeated use by the drafter. 128 Form contracts, therefore, are
efficient because they obviate the need to consider and draft contract
terms on a case-by-case basis, and this efficiency translates directly to
savings for the vendor. 129 The reduction in transaction costs facilitated
by standardized forms in turn keeps prices lower, thus also benefiting
consumers. 130
Savings also flow from the fact that the drafter can, and often does,
effectively shift risks comprised within the transaction. 131 Common
risk-shifting clauses incorporated into form contracts include: warranty
disclaimers, 132 liquidated damages provisions, 133 exculpatory
(calling the problem of form contracts “inherently intractable”).
126. See Barnes, supra note 2, at 233 (“The practice of standard form contracting is a
universally accepted and acknowledged phenomenon.”); Horton, Flipping the Script, supra note
1, at 431 (“Virtually all modern contracts are standard forms.”); Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
supra note 8, at 1203 (“[N]early all commercial and consumer sales contracts are form driven.”);
William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 971, 973
(noting that the “real world” of sales “tends to be dominated by form contracts, rather than
contracts that are actually negotiated”).
127. Cf. Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts:
Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 199, 201
(2010) (“Most frequently, the costs of negotiating individual contracts will exceed the potential
profit from ‘routine’ transactions.”).
128. Warkentine, supra note 5, at 469.
129. Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains: Procedural
Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 944. The
primary transaction costs avoided by the use of standardized forms are the costs associated with
drafting and analyzing the effect of new contract provisions. Steven R. Salbu, Evolving Contract
as a Device for Flexible Coordination and Control, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 329, 376–77 (1997).
130. Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 747 (2002)
[hereinafter Hillman, Rolling Contracts].
131. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943). See Russell A. Hakes, Focusing on the Realities of the
Contracting Process—An Essential Step to Achieve Justice in Contract Enforcement, 12 DEL. L.
REV. 95, 115 (2011) (describing “risk allocation provisions” in non-negotiated contracts).
132. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 131, at 631–32 (positing that the “desire to avoid judicial
risks” motivated the use of warranty disclaimers in the machine industry); Robert A. Hillman &
Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 15–
16 (2009) (“[O]ur data shows that licensors are not reticent to make rather bold claims about their
products on their websites only to reverse position on their standard forms. These circumstances
are likely to mislead consumers, regardless of whether they read their e-standard forms, especially
if the claims are sufficiently clear and distinct to constitute express warranties and the consumer
reads the promises and representations shortly before committing to a purchase.”).
133. See Marrow, supra note 113, at 33–34 (“Liquidated damages clauses are designed, for
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clauses, 134 indemnification provisions, 135 and merger clauses.136 One
of the most important risks that firms seek to minimize through the use
of form provisions is “judicial risk”—the possibility that a court or jury
called upon to settle a dispute between contracting parties will decide
unfavorably and unpredictably against the merchant. 137 Thus, choice of
law provisions 138 and forum selection clauses 139 are often included
among standard boilerplate language in consumer contracts. Given the
potential volatility of judicial risk, it should come as no surprise that a
highly charged body of jurisprudence and scholarship debates the
inclusion of remedy limitation clauses in consumer standard form
contracts, particularly arbitration agreements and class action
waivers. 140 Finally, the ultimate risk-shifting provision may be the
unilateral change-of-terms clause, which gives the drafter the authority
to reallocate risks in its own favor at any time after the initial formation
of the contract. 141
the most part, to accommodate real life commercial concerns by predictably controlling the risks
associated with human behavior.”).
134. See James F. Hogg, Consumer Beware: The Varied Application of Unconscionability
Doctrine to Exculpation and Indemnification Clauses in Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1011, 1023 (“The waiver and exculpation clauses reverse the ordinary
and predictable common law result. They tend to shelter negligent behavior, behavior primarily
within the control of the party benefitted by the clause.”).
135. See id. at 1016 (defining indemnification provisions as clauses “purporting to require one
party to hold the other harmless for the other’s negligence”).
136. See Warkentine, supra note 5, at 478 (“[A]n unsophisticated buyer of goods may enter
into a contract relying on promises and representations made by the seller. When a dispute arises
later, and the buyer bases a claim on those promises and representations, the buyer may find that a
court will not enforce them because of a merger clause in the contract of which the buyer was
unaware.”).
137. Kessler, supra note 131, at 631.
138. See Jillian R. Camarote, A Little More Contract Law with My Contracts Please: The
Need to Apply Unconscionability Directly to Choice-of-Law Clauses, 39 SETON HALL L. REV.
605, 605 (2009) (noting that firms manage the risk of state law invalidating contract provisions
through the use of choice of law provisions). Camarote notes that although UCC section 1-301
gives a very narrowly defined class of consumers some protection from choice-of-law clauses,
most consumers are affected by choice-of-law provisions included in standard form contracts. Id.
at 606 & n.7.
139. See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 700 (1992) (“The [choice
of forum] clause reduces uncertainty and the risk of litigation over the proper forum for suit
should unforeseen problems develop.”).
140. The depth and variety of scholarship addressing the use of arbitration clauses and class
action waivers in standard form contracts cannot be captured in a single footnote. A sampling of
recent articles discussing the fairness of these provisions includes the following: Christopher R.
Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695; David S. Schwartz,
Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009); and Jean R.
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005).
141. See, e.g., Alces & Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1100–06 (discussing generally the many
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A. Barriers to Knowing Assent and Voluntary Choice
If any of the risk-shifting terms previously described appeared in
agreements negotiated between persons of equal bargaining power,
there would be arguably little cause for concern. The central principle
of contract law—freedom of contract—maintains that parties may freely
enter into transactions on the terms that they voluntarily choose for
themselves through a process of mutual negotiation. 142 However, a
powerful set of complex and interwoven forces, both psychological and
market-driven, seriously undermine consumer assent to form terms.
The sliding scale approach to unconscionability offers courts a means of
addressing these forces without undermining the practical utility of the
standard form. In this way, the sliding scale represents an improvement
over not only the conventional approach to unconscionability, but also
over other proposed approaches to standardized contracts, all of which
fail to fully appreciate the deep deficiencies that plague consumer assent
in form transactions.
1. Psychological Barriers to Knowing Assent
One cannot meaningfully assent to terms contained in a contract
without first having knowledge of the existence of those terms and the
capability to understand their meaning and potential consequences.143
Unfortunately, consumers suffer from a variety of practical, cognitive,
and behavioral limitations that, working together, render them ignorant
of standardized terms and largely incapable of assessing their associated
contexts in which one party reserves the right to unilaterally change the terms of a contract). See
generally Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 985 (2010)
(exploring the ways in which sellers use contract modifications to increase profits at the
consumer’s expense); David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605 (2010) [hereinafter Horton, Shadow Terms] (arguing that the
manner sellers use to unilaterally amend contract terms “undermines the foundational
conservative theory that sophisticated adherents can exert market pressure on drafters to offer
efficient procedural terms”); Eric Andrew Horwitz, Comment, An Analysis of Change-of-Terms
Provisions as Used in Consumer Services Contracts of Adhesion, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 75
(2006) (examining the application of change-of-terms provisions to various types of adhesive
service contracts); Daniel Watkins, Note, Terms Subject to Change: Assent and
Unconscionability in Contracts that Contemplate Amendment, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 545 (2009)
(discussing assent and unconscionability inquiries in dealing with change-of-terms provisions).
142. See Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge
that is yet to be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 725 (2008) [hereinafter Becher, Asymmetric
Information] (“According to the classical paradigm of contract law, a contract results from a
negotiation process in which the parties freely engage.”); Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS
OF CONSENT 251, 251 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (“Contract law, both in
principle and in practice, is about allowing parties to enter arrangements on terms they choose,
each party imposing obligations on itself in return for obligations another party has placed upon
itself.”).
143. Bix, supra note 142, at 253.
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risks.
First, contract scholars have long accepted the notion that most
people who sign standard contracts do not read them. 144 What little
empirical research that has been conducted on the veracity of this claim
supports it, 145 as does anecdotal evidence 146 and the personal
experience of legal scholars 147 and judges. 148 Consumers’ failure to
144. Rakoff, Adhesion, supra note 125, at 1179 & n.21.
145. See generally, e.g., Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 127, at 215–16 (concluding that
most consumers do not read contracts at the time of contracting, though some read contracts after
signing); Hillman, Rolling Contracts, supra note 130, at 759 (surveying first year law students
and finding that seventy-six percent do not read the terms enclosed with delivered goods); Robert
A. Hillman, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of
Legal Implications, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’
283 (Jane Winn ed., 2006) (surveying law students regarding reading practices and concluding
that only four percent to thirteen percent actually read the terms of online contracts); Daniel
Keating, Measuring Sales Law Against Sales Practice: A Reality Check, 17 J.L. & COM. 99, 106
(1982) (describing extensive interviews with over a dozen buyers and sellers in which “virtually
none” read the contract beyond the key terms); Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms
in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678, 2703–04 (2000) (detailing interviews of twenty-five companies
in which half stated they believed the other side in the contract process never or rarely read the
standard forms); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 56–62 (1963) (discussing a study of 1960s businessmen that addressed
informal contracting practices and stating that most purchasing agents do not read the “fine print”
of standard contracts); Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical
Study, 69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 256 (1970) (describing a survey of 100 residential tenants in
Michigan that revealed that only fifty-seven percent actually read the entirety of their lease
agreement); John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 778–79 & n.207 (1982) [hereinafter Murray,
Standardized Agreement] (noting that the author conducted seminars with over 5000 purchasing
agents and had “never discovered one who read or understood printed terms”); Debra Pogrund
Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite
Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 617, 628 (2009) (surveying law students
and members of the public and concluding that “a sizeable number of consumers fail to read the
contracts that they sign”).
146. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (reporting that
AT&T found that only 30% percent of its customers would read its entire form agreement
updating contract terms, 10% would not read it at all, and 25% would throw away the mailing
without even opening it), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
2003).
147. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 358 (“Personally, I neither read most of the
contracts that I sign nor know anyone who does. I do not believe that this makes me unusually
irrational, particularly stupid, or unreasonably lazy.”); American4FinanReform, Elizabeth Warren
Defends the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, YOUTUBE (July 17, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYd08e5Cjvs&feature=player_embedded (“I teach contract
law at Harvard, and I can’t understand half of what [a credit card contract] says.”).
148. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the
Computer Fine Print, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 7:17 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he_doesnt_read_the_computer_fine_print/ (“It has, ‘the
smallest type you can imagine and you unfold it like a map,’ he said. ‘It is a problem,’ he added,
‘because the legal system obviously is to blame for that.’”); David Lat, Do Lawyers Actually
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read the contracts that they sign is not necessarily irresponsible. In fact,
scholars recognize that form contracts are designed not to be read,149
and thus maintain that consumers’ failure to read is an effect of
“rational ignorance”—the irrationality of reading standardized
agreements when the costs of reading outweigh the risks of failing to do
so. 150 Many factors point away from the rationality of reading. Form
contracts are typically difficult to read, as they are often lengthy and
printed in small type. 151 Consumers are well aware that they will likely
not understand the contracts that they sign. Thus, they are largely
discouraged from expending the effort required to carefully review the
fine print. 152 Moreover, the futility of reading is underscored by
consumers’ cognizance that they are generally powerless to negotiate
standard terms. 153 Furthermore, the contracting environment often
makes reading less likely; already hurried consumers are rushed through
the contracting process and made to feel as though careful review of the
provisions is socially inappropriate. 154 As a result, many consumers are
reluctant to carefully scrutinize boilerplate contract language at the time
of signing for fear of appearing awkward or confrontational. 155
The failure of consumers to read standardized terms is highly
problematic, but is only one of many forces that influence consumer
assent to those provisions. For instance, experts have discovered that
many consumers lack the legal 156 and financial 157 literacy to navigate
Read Boilerplate Contracts?, ABOVE THE LAW (June 22, 2010, 2:42 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actually-read-boilerplate-contracts-judge-richardposner-doesnt-do-you/ (“For my home equity loan, I got 100s of pages of documentation; I didn’t
read, I just signed.”).
149. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 31, at 504.
150. See Peter A. Alces, Guerrilla Terms, 56 EMORY L.J. 1511, 1529–30 & n.60 (2007)
[hereinafter Alces, Guerrilla Terms] (“[T]he ‘search’ cost of discovering the higher price and
greater risk is too great given the benefit the buyer imagines she would derive from discovering
the cost.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 832 (2006) (arguing the cost imposed on consumers
in gaining information may exceed the benefit, resulting in consumers’ rational ignorance);
Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 243 (“Where form contracts involve a low dollar value of
performance, the cost of thorough search and deliberation on preprinted terms, let alone the cost
of legal advice about the meaning and effect of the terms, will usually be prohibitive in relation to
the benefits.”). See also Prentice, supra note 147, at 358–62 (arguing that given high information
costs and time constraints, failure to read boilerplate constitutes rational, rather than irrational,
behavior).
151. Becher, Asymmetric Information, supra note 142, at 731.
152. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 446.
153. Id. See Prentice, supra note 147, at 361 (arguing that there is little benefit from reading
boilerplate because the seller’s agent is typically powerless to alter the terms of the deal).
154. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 448.
155. Id. at 448–49.
156. Meyerson, Consumer Form Contract, supra note 8, at 598.
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complex standard contracts, which are often filled with technical jargon
and “legalese.” 158 Other researchers have uncovered a more alarming
fact—most American consumers lack the basic reading skills to
understand the contracts that they sign. 159 One commentator, reviewing
a recent study of U.S. Department of Education data concerning literacy
rates, concluded that 96% to 97% of all American adults lack the basic
literacy skills required to understand consumer standard form contracts
of even moderate complexity. 160 Put differently, only 3% to 4% of the
population can understand the basic, everyday contracts that they
sign. 161 This data illustrates that “[t]he degree of literacy required to
comprehend the average disclosure form and key contract terms simply
is not within the reach of the majority of American adults.” 162 The
rising number of American consumers for whom English is a second
language often face even greater difficulty grasping the full meaning of

157. See Marianne A. Hilgert & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Household Financial Management: The
Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior, in FED. RES. BULL. 309 (July 2003) (analyzing
consumer survey research on household financial-management practices); Matthew A. Edwards,
Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest
for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 232 (2005) (questioning whether
consumers are sufficiently educated or well-informed “to comparison shop for credit”); Jinkook
Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers’ Understanding of APRs and
Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 66, 70, 74–75 (1999) (discussing a study
in which only ten percent of closed-end mortgage borrowers understood the relationship between
the contract interest rate and the APR). See generally William R. Emmons, Consumer-Finance
Myths and Other Obstacles to Financial Literacy, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 335 (2005)
(exploring skills needed for financial literacy, the myths of consumer finance, and obstacles to
achieving widespread financial literacy).
158. See generally Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 CHI. KENT L.
REV. 59 (2001) (discussing the manner and complexity in which legal terminology is used in
contracts).
159. See Edwards, supra note 157, at 232 (addressing “general literacy and educational
problems” that limit consumer understanding); Melvin A. Einsenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 305, 309 (1986) (“The average consumer knows that he probably will be unable to fully
understand the dense text of a form contract, either term-by-term or as an integrated whole.”).
See also Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, The Whole Truth, and Nothing but
the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 208 (2008) (citing
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND
FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURE TO CONSUMERS 38 (2006), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf) (“Only slightly more than half the adult U.S.
population can read above an eighth grade level.”); White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 234
(“New research measuring the literacy of the U.S. population demonstrates that even consumers
who might take the time and trouble to ‘read’ contemporary consumer contract documents are
unlikely to understand them.”).
160. Barnes, supra note 2, at 261–62 (citing White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 237–38).
161. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 647, 712 (2011). Ben-Shahar and Schneider also review rates of innumeracy revealing
that most people have serious difficulties performing simple mathematical operations. Id.
162. White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 239.
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contract provisions. 163
Furthermore, psychologists who study consumer cognition and
decision making have demonstrated that consumers suffer from a range
of limitations on their capability to understand the risks inherent in
contracting. 164 Even assuming that consumers are willing and able to
read form contracts, they are highly unlikely to understand their
contents. According to the theory of “bounded rationality,” consumers
suffer from limitations on their time, financial resources, available
memory, and cognitive powers that combine to prevent a perfect or
“optimal” decision in the contracting process. 165 Consumers tend not to
invest in an exhaustive process of acquiring and understanding
information about the risks of standardized terms, but rather are
satisfied by a limited—and often inadequate—search for information
about contractual risks. 166 After an incomplete information search,
consumers often base their decisions about whether to contract on a
limited number of factors, such as price and product characteristics.167
Moreover, consumers tend to underestimate the possibility of negative
consequences resulting from their actions and ignore what they perceive
to be low-probability risks. 168 Together with numerous other consumer
163. Edwards, supra note 157, at 232 (citing Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for
Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1027, 1075–77 (1995)).
164. Barnes, supra note 2, at 254 (citing Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 213); Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 445–54; Marrow, supra note 113, at 57.
165. Barnes, supra note 2, at 254–55 (citing Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 214); Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, supra note 8, at 1222–25.
166. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 451–53. Empirical evidence demonstrates that
this behavior, known as “satisficing,” is a poor substitute for fully informed, rational decision
making. See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower:
Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1481, 1531 (2006) (“Cognitive experiments demonstrate that individuals adopt time-saving
strategies in order to simplify complex decisionmaking. . . . Some of these shortcuts
systematically color and bias the decisions that individuals reach and undercut the notion that
consumers should be modeled as rational actors.”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1111–13 (2000) (explaining that boilerplate is difficult to contract around
because contracting parties see default terms as part of the “status quo” and therefore, all else
being equal, prefer them to alternate terms). See also Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision
Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 507 (1979) (explaining that people
often reach decisions based on a “search of only a tiny part” of the total available information).
Simon is credited with coining the term “satisficing.” Id.
167. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 451–53.
168. Barnes, supra note 2, at 257–59; Marrow, supra note 113, at 63–66. This effect results
from the operation of the “availability” heuristic, according to which consumers assess the
probability of an event by reference to similar events, and the “representativeness” heuristic,
according to which the probability of an event is evaluated by its familiarity. For further
discussion of heuristics that influence decision making, see Richard A. Hasen, Efficiency Under
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tendencies identified by cognitive psychologists, 169 these limitations
render most consumers incapable of meaningfully assenting to the risks
imposed by standard contract provisions. 170
Finally, a number of scholars predict that online contracting will
exacerbate rather than improve these cognitive barriers to meaningful
assent. 171 Many of the perceived “benefits” of online contracting—for
example, the fact that consumers have additional time to gather
information and review contract provisions—are undermined by the
same cognitive limitations that operate on consumers in traditional
settings. 172 First, most cognitive limitations are largely “internal to
consumers” rather than a product of the contracting environment. 173
Moreover, the online contracting environment contains a number of
specific features that may significantly undermine consumers’ access to,
and understanding of, standard form provisions. The location of
contract terms in hyperlinks unlikely to be accessed by consumers is
one such feature, as is the lack of any live interaction with a
representative of the merchant during the contracting process. 174 In
some cases, contract terms are not supplied to the consumer until after
the consumer enters into the contract. Although consumers are
generally cognizant of the importance of affixing their signatures to
paper contracts, it is unclear whether clicking “I agree” denotes the
same level of solemnity for Internet consumers. 175
Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 395–96
(1990); Marrow, supra note 113, at 63–66.
169. The literature covering the cognitive limitations that effect contracting behavior is vast.
This Article merely attempts to highlight some cognitive effects that impede meaningful assent to
standard form contracts. For a more complete discussion of such limitations, see Cass. R.
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997).
170. Psychologists who study judgment and choice acknowledge that all consumers do not
suffer from identical cognitive vulnerabilities; rather, individuals’ cognitive and decision making
abilities vary. However, experimental evidence tends to show that individuals’ cognitive
abilities, expertise levels, and demographic variables such as race, sex, and age do not predictably
influence the quality of decision making. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual
Differences, and Paternalism, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 125, 125–26 (Belinda Brooks-Gordon
& Michael Freeman eds., 2006).
171. See, e.g., Alces, Guerilla Terms, supra note 150, at 1554 (“[T]echnology will lead to
more rather than less obfuscation by ‘streamlining’ the contract formation process and
encouraging the proliferation of more settings in which constructive consent will suffice.”).
172. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 484–85.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 464–68; Hillman & Barakat, supra note 132, at 13–15.
175. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 480–81 (“[O]vereager, ‘click-happy’ econsumers may engage in impulse purchasing without investigating standard terms at all.”);
Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by Terms of
Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 408, 418–32 (2010) (describing how passive users of online
content are often unwittingly bound by terms in user agreements).
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2. Market-Based Barriers to Voluntariness
The cognitive and psychological factors described above seriously
affect consumer decision making, but they are not solely to blame for
the poor quality of consumer assent to standardized forms. Market
forces also undermine consumers’ voluntary choice with respect to form
terms. 176 Consumer form contracts are “contracts of adhesion,” drafted
unilaterally by the party with greater bargaining power and presented on
a “take it or leave it” basis. 177 The adhesive quality of standard form
contracts is inextricably tied to their utility—the drafter loses much of
the efficiency of pre-drafting and pre-printing a standard contract if the
individual terms are later renegotiated. 178 Further, in view of the
objective theory of contract formation and the so-called “duty to read,”
form contracts generally meet the traditional requirements for
enforceability, provided they are supported by objective indicia of
assent. 179 The profound disparity in bargaining power present in
contracts of adhesion prevents consumers from negotiating their
content. 180 Thus, consumers routinely sign form contracts without
meaningfully assenting to standardized terms contained within. 181
What about reasonable alternatives offered by other firms in the
marketplace? Assuming that some consumers will successfully access
and fully comprehend standardized provisions, does the marketplace
176. Bix, supra note 142, at 254.
177. Kessler, supra note 131, at 632. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a LifeInsurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919) (applying, for the first time, the term
“adhesion” to a form contract). Although some experts in the past have maintained that form
contracts are not necessarily adhesionary, both courts and commentators increasingly have
recognized that practically all contracts signed by consumers are not only standard in form, but
are also adhesionary. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011)
(“[T]he times in which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”);
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27A, at 155 (rev. ed. Supp. 2008)
[hereinafter CORBIN ON CONTRACTS] (“[T]he bulk of contracts signed in this country are
adhesion contracts.”).
178. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 102 (2007); Horton, Flipping
the Script, supra note 1, at 474.
179. John D. Calamari, Duty to Read—A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341, 341–
42 (1974).
180. See Alces & Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1099–102 (discussing the impact of unilateral
change-of-terms agreements on the already disparate parties’ bargaining power); Morant, supra
note 129, at 944–45 (noting that because the advantaged party often drafts the preformed contract,
it may “prejudice the interests of the more disadvantaged party”).
181. See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971) (“[I]n the usual case, the consumer never
even reads the form, or reads it only after he has become bound by its terms.”). See generally
David D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 208–22 (2005)
(discussing whether disparities in bargaining power leave meaningful opportunities for
negotiation).
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offer consumers a choice of standardized terms from which they can
select? Economists once predicted that market forces would regulate
standardized forms, particularly those containing extremely one-sided
and risk-shifting terms. 182 According to the theory of “market assent,”
the form terms used by merchants would be influenced by a small
proportion of informed consumers who read standardized agreements
and shopped for favorable standard terms. 183 Firms would then
compete for market share by omitting onerous terms or even including
more favorable ones. 184 Proponents of this view hypothesized that
firms are sensitive to their market reputations and thus will not impose
onerous terms at the risk of driving away their customer base. 185
However, recent contributions to economic theory suggest that the
model of the self-regulating market is false. 186 Even savvy, informed
consumers suffer from biases and cognition limits that render them
unlikely (at best) or incapable (at worst) to consider the ramifications of

182. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of the Bargain: An Economic Theory of How
Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers,
104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 862–63 (2006) (“Regardless of whether any particular consumer had
ever read, understood, or bargained over the terms of the standard form, informed consumers
generated a form of hypothetical market assent, which would bind all consumers.”); George L.
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1299–302 (1981)
(noting general trends in contract content over time); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests,
69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1391–92 (1983) (explaining the effect that significantly informed
consumers can have on market forces); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets
on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630,
672 (1979) (addressing the impact consumer actions may have on market competition); Alan
Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1065–67
(1977) (discussing the immense advantages sellers currently have over consumers and courts
when ascertaining the fairness of standardized forms). See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling
Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679 (discussing reasonable alternatives to
current standardized contract provisions).
183. Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 127, at 205 n.22; Johnston, supra note 182, at 862–
63.
184. Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of EStandard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 843 (2006) [hereinafter Hillman, Online
Boilerplate].
185. See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 150, at 827.
186. Alces, Guerilla Terms, supra note 150, at 1523 (citing Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson,
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets,
121 Q.J. ECON. 505 (2006)); Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 127, at 199, 214; Ted Cruz &
Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for
Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 638–40 (1996); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis
of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 843 (2003). See
Korobkin, supra note 8, at 1212 (arguing that because contract terms may not enter buyers’
decision making processes, drafting parties may have an incentive to include inefficient contract
terms in standard forms).
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most risk-shifting provisions. 187 Because standardized terms do not
influence consumer behavior, drafters have little incentive to compete
on the basis of those provisions. 188 Thus, the forms utilized by
competing suppliers of goods and services remain largely uniform, 189
rendering consumers virtually powerless to avoid unfavorable
standardized terms. 190 While recent empirical research demonstrates
that some merchants grant their agents the authority to exercise
discretion to forgive contract breaches and extend benefits beyond those
provided in standardized terms, 191 this type of merchant behavior is
completely discretionary and leaves the consumer with no real power
over the contract. 192
Moreover, a wealth of literature has established that firms target
consumers’ cognitive vulnerabilities in their marketing and sales
practices. 193 Aware that consumers are unlikely to read contracts, some
firms dispense with the “formality” of showing the contract to the
consumer at all. 194 Others manipulate the contracting environment to
purposefully exploit consumers’ cognitive limitations. 195 Worse, the
187. Horton, Shadow Terms, supra note 141, at 647–48.
188. Alces, Guerilla Terms, supra note 150, at 1547; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at
446–47; Horton, Shadow Terms, supra note 141, at 648.
189. Andrew Robertson, The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 179,
194 (2005).
190. See Alces & Greenfield, supra note 3, at 1137 (“Given the prevalence of change-of-terms
clauses, a consumer cannot reasonably avoid them. In that sense then, there is an absence of
meaningful choice.”).
191. Johnston, supra note 182, at 864. See Lucian A. Bebchuck & Richard A. Posner, OneSided Contracts in Competitive Markets, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET
CONTRACTS 3, 4 (2007) (arguing that one-sided boilerplate permits sellers “discretion with
respect to how to treat the consumer”).
192. Johnston, supra note 182, at 885. Professor Johnston acknowledges that a firm that
“rigidly enforces the harsh terms of its standard-form contracts . . . is just doing what it has a
contractual right to do and is in a sense a much more straightforward actor than the firm that
awards discretionary forgiveness and discretionary benefits.” Id. at 886–87.
193. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 715–22 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, The
Problem of Market Manipulation] (discussing an ALI Reporter’s study and other articles that
ultimately support the authors’ conclusion that consumers are susceptible to manipulation by
manufacturers because of consumers’ cognitive anomalies); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1420, 1425 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation]
(providing evidence that manufacturers manipulate consumers’ perceptions and cognitive biases,
which influences their decision making). But see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffery J.
Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise
Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 233 (2000) (arguing that proponents of enterprise
liability have not produced evidence showing how advertisements or other sales methods
effectively manipulate consumers).
194. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 31.
195. Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 193, at 673
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perception that firms are self-regulating appears to further impede
rational decision making. Consumers have a tendency to trust the
entities with which they contract to refrain from including boilerplate
terms that would exploit consumers at the risk of their reputations. This
sense of trust further persuades consumers not to read and carefully
consider the implications of contract provisions. 196
One could argue that despite the fact that these market forces tend to
dictate the content of form provisions, consumers retain voluntariness in
their ability to choose not to contract at all. However, this argument is
an empty one. Form contracts permeate all aspects of consumers’ lives,
as they have been adopted by nearly all industries and trades. 197 Forms
are used for transacting in all manners of goods and services, by cellular
service providers, financial lenders, health clubs, mortgage companies,
credit card issuers, rental companies, online music stores, and even
healthcare service and insurance providers. 198 “A person today who
refused to contract unless he understood what he was committing
himself to would deny himself most of the means of living in
society.” 199
B. Incomplete Approaches to Incomplete Assent
The standard form contract dilemma, while both controversial and
multidimensional, is also a moving target. As social scientists make
new discoveries about the limitations on consumers’ abilities to access,
understand, and make rational choices concerning standardized terms,
the legal norms that govern standard contracts should evolve
accordingly. 200 However, legal theory has not kept pace with
advancements in the understanding of consumer cognition and behavior.
Many recent scholarly approaches to form contracts fail to fully explore
and account for the full panoply of barriers to meaningful and voluntary
choice faced by consumers. Indeed, most conceive of the standard
contract dilemma as no more than a problem of incomplete information.
(discussing an experiment demonstrating how the status quo bias affects consumer individual
preferences in contracting); Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, supra note
193, at 1429 (examining several instances in which manufacturers manipulated general consumer
perceptions in the purchasing context).
196. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 446–47 & nn.95–97.
197. Barnes, supra note 2, at 229.
198. Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule of
Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 381, 384 (2008).
199. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 21.
200. See BEHAVIOR, LAW, AND ECONOMICS 2 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (“Analysis of law
should be linked with what we have been learning about human behavior and choice. After all,
the legal system is pervasively in the business of constructing procedures, descriptions, and
contexts for choice.”).
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According to this view, consumers cannot meaningfully assent to
standardized provisions in form contracts because they are not fully
apprised of their content and meaning. The remainder of this Section
reviews the recent approaches to standardized contracts espousing this
view and explains why they fall short of rectifying the profound
deficiencies of assent and fairness implicit in form contracting.
1. Mandatory Disclosure and Heightened Assent
A number of scholars have argued that standardized terms in form
contracts should be enforced only if they are explicitly brought to
consumers’ attention. These “disclosure” models are of two types. One
type suggests that courts should control the enforceability of form terms
by requiring a showing that nonbargained-for terms in a form contract
are both conspicuous and specifically assented to by the consumer.
Thus, form terms are presumptively unenforceable absent specific
evidence of objective assent to the particular terms. Numerous
scholarly proposals of this type have been advanced over the years.
Professor Todd Rakoff famously asserted that nonbargained-for or
“invisible” terms should be presumed unenforceable when challenged in
litigation, unless the drafter could show their “visibility.” 201 Professor
Alex Seita later proposed that form contracts should be governed by
default terms and overcome by standardized provisions only when the
consumer gives “intelligent and meaningful” approval. 202 Professor
Michael Meyerson suggested that “consumers should only be bound by
those contract terms that they know and comprehend.” 203 More
recently, Professor Edith Warkentine called for a “knowing assent”
approach, whereby standardized terms that unfairly favor the drafter
would be enforceable only upon a showing that the term was
conspicuous and explained to the consumer, who in turn specifically
and objectively assented to the inclusion of that term in the contract. 204
Another variation of the disclosure model proposes legislatively
mandated disclosure of potentially onerous form terms. Mandated
disclosure requirements naturally tend to be industry-specific, aimed at
providing consumers with access to information about products and
contractual contingencies in an easy to understand form. 205 One wellknown mandatory disclosure scheme, enacted under the Truth in
201. Rakoff, Adhesion, supra note 125, at 1245, 1258.
202. Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 132 (1984).
203. Meyerson, Reunification, supra note 6, at 1299.
204. Warkentine, supra note 5, at 473.
205. See Becher, Asymmetric Information, supra note 142, at 755 (discussing the purposes of
mandated disclosure requirements and when they are typically imposed).
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Lending Act, 206 requires disclosure of a number of contractual
contingencies in certain financial transactions, including the
circumstances under which fees may be imposed. 207 Like judicially
enforced disclosure models, some legislatively mandated disclosure
models deny the enforceability of particular provisions unless drafters
comply with certain disclosure requirements. 208
Proponents of disclosure argue that mandated disclosure provides
consumers with information necessary to make better decisions.209
Moreover, proponents predict that once consumers are educated about
the terms of the contracts they sign, they will demand more favorable
terms from the marketplace. 210 Disclosure will motivate sellers to
excise unfair terms from their contracts, lest they place their reputations
in jeopardy or risk losing consumers to merchants with more favorable
terms. 211 Increased and targeted information thus will result in the selfregulation of the marketplace. Disclosure requirements are also
attractive to lawmakers because they address efforts to make the
substance of form contracts transparent rather than substantively
regulating the terms of consumer contracts, which is often politically
challenging. 212 Mandated disclosure is therefore an alluring response to
standard contracts because it is a solution that is likely to be adopted. 213
Disclosure models are laudable for their efforts to increase the flow
of information to, and improve the decision making capabilities of,
consumers. 214 Many academics, however, question the wisdom of
relying on these models to improve the quality and authenticity of
consumer assent. 215 Critics of mandated disclosure argue, and even
some proponents admit, that consumers are not substantially more likely
to read disclosures than the form terms themselves. 216 Moreover, even
206. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (West 2012).
207. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 161, at 653–55.
208. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316 (1962) (requiring warranty disclaimers to be “conspicuous” as a
prerequisite to enforceability).
209. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 161, at 650.
210. Burnham, supra note 124, at 223.
211. Hillman, Online Boilerplate, supra note 184, at 839, 845–46.
212. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 161, at 681.
213. Hillman, Online Boilerplate, supra note 184, at 839.
214. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 161, at 649.
215. See, e.g., Hillman, Online Boilerplate, supra note 184, at 849–50 (suggesting that
mandatory website disclosure may not be effective as consumers do not act predictably and may
even backfire); Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know about “Separability” in
Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 10–12 (2003) (urging that even
conspicuous arbitration clauses may be ineffective in drawing consumers’ attention); White &
Mansfield, supra note 7, at 234 (questioning the efficacy of disclosure forms for consumers
generally and specifically whether consumers would understand such forms).
216. See, e.g., Becher, Asymmetric Information, supra note 142, at 757 (discussing some of
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when consumers are provided with disclosures, the cognitive limitations
that prevent consumers from making rational decisions about
contractual contingencies continue to operate. 217
As stated by
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider in their recent
comprehensive critique of mandated disclosure, disclosure is
“fundamentally misconceived because its solution to the problem of
choice is information alone,” and it ignores the evidence that “people’s
problems choosing go well beyond ignorance.” 218
Another
commentator has remarked, “[t]o the extent that one does not
understand the terms of the agreement, requiring the same to be printed
in bold letters is like yelling at a deaf man.” 219 Additionally, mandated
disclosures may actually worsen consumers’ decision making
capabilities. Disclosures can provide excessive information, resulting in
cognitive overload and increased confusion. 220
And because
disclosures are unlikely to improve the quality of decision making with
respect to standardized terms, they are likewise unlikely to motivate
businesses to self-regulate the content of those provisions.
Ultimately, the notion that voluntary assent and personal autonomy
are empowered by disclosure is misguided.
While additional
information may, under some circumstances, be useful to consumers, on
balance, attempts to disclose and explain standardized provisions do
little to improve the quality of consumer assent to those terms or the
content of those provisions.
2. Expectations Doctrines
Expectations-based approaches to standard contracts, according to
which only those form provisions that conform to consumers’
expectations should be enforceable, are also popular with some
academics today. 221 Expectations doctrines are an outgrowth of Karl
Llewellyn’s theory of “blanket assent” to standardized forms. 222
the deficiencies of information disclosure in light of consumer behavior); Hillman & Barakat,
supra note 132, at 12–17 (arguing that consumers do not read standard electronic forms).
217. Marrow, supra note 113, at 98–99; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological
Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1177 (2003).
218. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 161, at 720.
219. Jacqueline R. Baum, Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Patient’s Perspective, 61
WASH. U. L.Q. 123, 148 n.198 (1983).
220. Becher, Asymmetric Information, supra note 142, at 758.
221. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 2, at 227 (arguing in favor of the increased use of
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 211 to police standardized agreements); White &
Mansfield, supra note 7, at 263 (arguing that unconscionability should converge with the
reasonable expectations approach).
222. See W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts
Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 33 (1984) [hereinafter Slawson, New Meaning]
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Llewellyn famously posited that the notion that consumers assent to
standardized terms is purely fictional and instead suggested that, beyond
the “dickered” terms contained in the contract, consumers assent only to
the “broad type of the transaction” and “any not unreasonable or
indecent terms the seller may have had in his form, which do not alter or
eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.” 223
Llewellyn’s theory thus stands out as a rejection of the strict application
of the objective theory of contract formation and the duty to read as
applied to consumer form contracts by holding “unreasonable” terms
unenforceable despite external indications of assent. 224 Expectationsbased approaches similarly provide exceptions to the duty to read in the
consumer form context by limiting the effect of terms found to be
“unexpected” by the parties.
Scholars advocating expectations-based approaches call for an
expansion of one of two devices currently employed by courts: the
doctrine of reasonable expectations and section 211 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. Section 211 was developed specifically for the
treatment of standardized agreements and embraces the traditional duty
to read by declaring that a party who signs a standardized agreement is
bound by its terms. 225 The provision, however, goes on to create an
exception to this general approach, under which a term may be excised
from the agreement when “the other party has reason to believe that the
party manifesting such assent would not do so” had he known of the
provision. 226 The doctrine of reasonable expectations is a judicial
doctrine related to, but distinct from, section 211. This doctrine holds
that the objectively reasonable expectations of consumers regarding
contract terms will be honored even though a painstaking study of the
(discussing Llewellyn’s theory of “blanket assent”).
223. LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 5, at 370. Llewellyn contrasts “dickered”
terms—material terms that are negotiated by the parties—with “boilerplate.” Id. at 370–71.
224. Warkentine, supra note 5, at 489–90.
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
Section 211, titled
“Standardized Agreements,” provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise
manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly
used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an
integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing.
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those terms
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard
terms of the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not
part of the agreement.
Id.
226. Id. § 211(3).
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provisions would have negated those expectations. 227 While section
211 requires courts to consider whether the terms conflict with the
drafter’s reasonable expectations of the consumer’s behavior, the
doctrine of reasonable expectations permits courts to eliminate terms
that conflict with the consumer’s reasonable expectations. 228 The
difference between the results reached under either approach turns on
which point of view the court adopts. Both doctrines, however, are
cognizant that consumers are often not apprised of the content in
standardized provisions and seek to remedy this deficiency in assent.
Expectations approaches share a number of attributes that should
point to their success. First, it is axiomatic that “[c]ontract doctrine is
designed to protect the expectations of the parties.” 229
Thus,
expectations doctrines comport with the fundamentals of classical
contract theory. Second, expectations approaches discourage merchants
from creating unreasonable or inaccurate expectations through the use
of marketing or promotional materials. 230 Moreover, expectations
approaches implicitly recognize that consumers will not read or
understand form contracts, and thus these contracts are fertile ground
for overreaching and oppression. 231 Therefore, these approaches appear
capable of satisfying concerns of both traditionalists and consumer
advocates.
In practice, however, expectations doctrines have not thrived. Both
section 211 and the reasonable expectations doctrine have been limited
primarily to the policing of insurance contracts. 232 Additionally, when
measured against the realities of consumer behavior in the marketplace,
expectations approaches admit a number of structural flaws.
Expectations approaches are premised on the assumptions that
consumers develop specific expectations about the standardized terms
227. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 967 (1970); see id. at 966–67 (arguing that increase-of-risk language in insurance
policies could be interpreted to honor consumers’ reasonable expectations).
228. But see Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 83–84 (noting that many courts in the
application of section 211 have focused on the consumers’, rather than the drafters’,
expectations).
229. Hartzog, supra note 175, at 408. See 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
1.1, at 2 (1963) [hereinafter 1 PERILLO, CORBIN] (“The law of contracts attempts the realization
of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making of a promise.”).
230. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 6.3(a)(4), at 634–35 (student
ed. 1988).
231. Barnes, supra note 2, at 250–51; Hillman, Rolling Contracts, supra note 130, at 748–49;
Warkentine, supra note 5, at 498, 508; James J. White, Form Contracts under Revised Article 2,
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 324–25 (1997); White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 262–64.
232. White & Mansfield, supra note 7, at 262–63.
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of the contracts that they sign and that these expectations are based on
rational evaluations of available information. 233 However, newly
emerging psychological evidence of consumers’ cognitive limitations
demonstrates that both of these assumptions are flawed. 234 Consumers
generally do not undertake a comprehensive evaluation of standardized
terms nor do they form expectations about those provisions. 235
Additionally, both expectations approaches admit the enforceability
of provisions of which the consumer is made aware. 236 Thus,
provisions that are made conspicuous to the consumer or otherwise
disclosed by the merchant are automatically included within the
expectations of consumers. Worse, provisions that consumers may have
failed to understand or incorporate into the decision making process due
to cognitive limitations will also fall within consumers’ expectations.
Expectations approaches are further weakened by market-based
limitations to consumer assent. These approaches tie the enforceability
of standardized terms to their familiarity. Presumably, if onerous form
terms are highly present in the marketplace and generally recognized by
the public, they will come to form the consumer’s “reasonable
expectations” regardless of how one-sided those terms may be or
whether the consumer had any real opportunity to shop for better terms
elsewhere in the market.
Section 211 is particularly flawed because, unlike the reasonable
expectations doctrine, it requires the consumer to show, as a
prerequisite to striking an unexpected form term, that he would not have
consented to the contract at all had he known of the term in advance.237
Thus, section 211 rests on an assumption that, once apprised of an
unfavorable standardized term, the consumer would decline to enter the
contract. This assumption ignores the cognitive factors that limit
consumer decision making, particularly the fact that consumers do not
base their decisions about whether to contract on the standardized
provisions that section 211 seeks to regulate. 238 It also fails to account
for the fact that, because form terms are often uniform across the
marketplace, consumers lack any real choice among alternatives.
233. Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 300 (1998).
234. Id. at 304–05.
235. Id. at 305.
236. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, supra note 130, at 749–50; KEETON & WIDISS, supra note
230, § 6.3(c) at 641–42.
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
238. See Slawson, New Meaning, supra note 222, at 62–63 (explaining that consumers do not
make purchasing decisions based on particular terms, but rather a rough, subjective evaluation of
all the terms).
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In sum, while expectations approaches provide much needed
exceptions to the traditional duty to read in the context of consumer
form contracts, they do not fully account for the full gamut of internal
and external forces that impede consumer assent, nor do they
necessarily operate to eliminate excessively onerous terms from the
marketplace. While calls for the expansion of these approaches are
praiseworthy for their efforts to bring contract doctrine in line with the
realities of form contracting, they fail to do so in a comprehensive
manner.
C. The Sliding Scale’s Meaningful Assent Inquiry
Early supporters of the unconscionability doctrine held high hopes
for its potential to reshape traditional notions of freedom of contract in
the realm of standardized agreements by authorizing courts to police
contracts lacking in meaningful assent. 239 However, courts have
struggled to identify those contracts in which consent is sufficiently
lacking to justify judicial intervention in the first place. The evolution
of the sliding scale approach represents a continued effort to identify
with more precision those agreements deserving the attention of the
court.
Under the two-part analytical framework, the procedural prong serves
to identify those contracts lacking meaningful assent. 240 Additionally,
the conventional approach to finding procedural unconscionability
requires specific indicia of surprise or oppression in the contracting
process. Because strong evidence of procedural deficiency has
historically been required to justify judicial intervention, courts
employing a conventional approach are unlikely to find the procedural
prong satisfied in the absence of multiple factors traditionally associated
with lack of choice, such as the use of fine print, a high pressure
environment, and the fact that the complaining party was too old,
impoverished, or unsophisticated to understand the significance of the
terms. 241
However, interdisciplinary research studying consumer cognition and
market forces demonstrate that the traditional objective indicia of assent
seized upon by most courts are not useful indicators of meaningful

239. See, e.g., John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 931, 935–36 (1969) (explaining that the unconscionability doctrine permits “freedom of
contract” to encompass the ability of parties to “co-determine the terms of a contract”).
240. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 706, 709.
241. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1111–12 (discussing “predictive power” of external
markers of consent in unconscionability decisions).
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choice with respect to standard form contracts. 242 Social psychologists
and behavioral economists have established that consent is undercut far
more dramatically by practical and cognitive limitations on consumers’
abilities to evaluate the risks associated with standardized terms and the
very futility of such an evaluation than by incomplete information.
Therefore, the conventional approach to procedural unconscionability is
a weak indicator of meaningful assent. Moreover, the conventional
approach is not merely unhelpful, but also harmful in its adherence to
faulty and obsolete assumptions about consumer decision making. As a
result, the conventional approach to procedural unconscionability
suffers from the same shortcomings of recent scholarly solutions to
standard form contracts, namely mandated disclosure, heightened
assent, and reasonable expectations doctrines.
The sliding scale approach, on the other hand, allows decision makers
to incorporate the emerging understanding of consumer behavior into
the unconscionability framework. First, the sliding scale’s reduced
threshold for procedural unconscionability deemphasizes the
importance of unhelpful external markers of assent. Indications that
language in the contract was bolded or that the consumer was given an
opportunity to review contract terms can be ignored when the facts
clearly demonstrate that the consumer lacked the power to negotiate
contract terms in the first place. Second, the use of the sliding scale by
some courts to find procedural unconscionability through the existence
of a contract of adhesion, without a detailed analysis of the
particularized contracting environment, focuses courts’ attention on
consumers’ bargaining power, which is by far the most significant
factor affecting meaningful assent to standardized terms.
III. ADDRESSING FORMALIST CONCERNS
Although the unconscionability doctrine was specifically designed to
provide courts with a means of correcting deficiencies in consent and
fairness that plague standard form contracts, until very recently its use
has been restricted both in scope and frequency. Courts’ reluctance to
employ the doctrine to control form contracts is tied directly to the
dominance of formalist thinking about contract enforcement and
judicial intervention in private agreements. While the persistence of
contract formalism once threatened to destroy unconscionability’s
viability as a policing device, a recent surge in unconscionability
jurisprudence evidences increasing judicial resistance to formalist
thought. The sliding scale approach further pushes against formalist
242. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the psychological barriers to knowing assent).
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thinking, but sufficiently balances formalist concerns such that it does
not run too far afoul of traditional contract doctrine.
A. Formalist Restraints on Judicial Interventionism
Unconscionability was mainstreamed into contract law with a single
and express purpose—to permit courts to police contracts on fairness
grounds. 243 Prior to the doctrine’s adoption, some courts took the
liberty of setting aside contracts that they determined to be so unfair as
to “shock the conscience.” 244 However, the vast majority of courts
were uncomfortable with such unconcealed judicial subjectivity and, as
a result, found indirect ways to deny enforcement of terms tinged with
overreaching, oppression, and unfair surprise. 245 These courts either
stretched existing doctrines of fraud, duress, and failure of consideration
beyond their boundaries or engaged in aggressively strict interpretation
of contractual provisions to prevent unfair results. 246 Out of regard for
“freedom of contract,” these courts did not explicitly invalidate
contracts on the basis of fairness, but rather concealed such
determinations behind accepted consent doctrines and devices of
construction. 247
Concerned with the “covert tools” employed by courts, 248 the drafters
of the UCC crafted a doctrine of unconscionability that would invite
jurists to employ a more intellectually honest approach to judicial
oversight. 249 The codification of unconscionability also served an
243. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 177, § 29.2; RUSCH, supra note 27, § 2-302:1; Harry
G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 459, 468–69 (1995); LORD, supra note 27, § 18:9.
244. See, e.g., Eyre v. Potter, 56 U.S. 42, 60 (1853) (proposing that courts “ought to interfere”
when there is unconscionability). The equitable power of the Court to set aside an
“unconscionable” contract was recognized as early as 1816. See Hepburn v. Dunlop & Co., 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 179, 197 (1816) (“But if the contract ought not, in conscience, to bind one of the
parties, . . . a court of equity will interpose and afford a relief, which a court of common law
cannot, by setting aside the contract . . . .”).
245. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 27, § 9.40; CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 177,
§ 29.2, at 381; MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 96(A)(2).
246. Dando B. Cellini & Barry L. Wertz, Unconscionable Contract Provisions: A History of
Unenforceability from Roman Law to the UCC, 42 TUL. L. REV. 193, 203–04 (1967); CORBIN,
supra note 177, § 29.2, at 380–81; MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 96(A)(2).
247. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 177, § 29.2; MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note
27, § 96(A)(2).
248. Karl N. Llewellyn, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702−03 (1939) (reviewing O. PRAUSNITZ,
THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW
(1937) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Book Review] ([W]e have developed a whole series of semi-covert
techniques for somewhat balancing these bargains. . . . Covert tools are never reliable tools.”).
249. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1952) provides:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against
the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such policing
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expressive function, alerting the judiciary of the need for judicial
intervention in contracts infected by bad faith bargaining and
overreaching. 250 In his testimony before the New York Law Revision
Commission, Llewellyn lamented that by indirectly policing unfair
bargains, courts failed to set minimum standards of decency for the
commercial community and to alert drafters when those standards had
been violated. 251 Codifying unconscionability, he predicted, would
correct that problem. 252
Early on, the judiciary embraced the flexibility and promise of
unconscionability by expanding it beyond the borders of the UCC and
integrating it into the broader realm of contract doctrine. 253 The
American Law Institute soon adopted an unconscionability provision in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts nearly identical to the one found
in the UCC. 254 Both sources of the doctrine are broadly formulated,
drawing no distinctions between merchants and consumers or preprinted
and negotiated contracts. 255 As a result, courts have applied the
doctrine to all types of contracts, both as a stand-alone doctrine and in
conjunction with other policing devices. 256
Soon after the adoption of the UCC, courts successfully deployed
unconscionability in a number of landmark decisions to protect
consumers from overreaching by form drafters. 257
The initial
has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the
rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public
policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. This section is intended to allow the
court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause
therein and to make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability.
Additionally, the legislative history of the UCC’s unconscionability provision makes clear that
the doctrine was imported into the UCC for the purpose of giving judges a sanctioned doctrine
with which to declare contractual terms invalid on fairness grounds. RUSCH, supra note 27, § 2302:1.
250. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1072; Knapp, supra note 16, at 609.
251. I LAW REVIEW COMM’N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVIEW COMMISSION FOR 1954 AND
RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 176–78 (1954).
252. Id.
253. DOBBS, supra note 27, § 10.7, at 703–04; SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28,
at 135, 140–42. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. was the first decision to explicitly
declare unconscionability to be part of the common law of contract. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965). Some courts refuse to apply the UCC’s formulation of unconscionability outside the
realm of sales of goods, acknowledging that the common law doctrine would be applicable to
services contracts. See, e.g., Troy Mining Corp. v. Itmann Coal Co., 346 S.E.2d 749, 752 (W.
Va. 1986).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
255. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1077−78 (pointing out courts’ apparent failure to
“define merchant in relationship to the unconscionability doctrine”).
256. Id. at 1078–79.
257. See Knapp, supra note 16, at 612–13 (discussing the impact of the landmark
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momentum of the unconscionability doctrine, however, was short lived.
Following widespread adoption of Leff’s two-part framework,
unconscionability claims became increasingly less successful.
Beginning in the 1970s, case law applying the unconscionability
doctrine was rather scarce, leading some commentators to declare its
demise. 258 Unconscionability claims were likewise rarely litigated, and
even more rarely successful, during the 1980s and early 1990s. 259 As
stated by one commentator, “[t]he conventional wisdom is that most
unconscionability claims fail.” 260
The forces that have operated against the success of the
unconscionability doctrine are many and varied. 261 By far the most
significant of these forces is the persistence of formalism in contract
theory—a rule-based approach to contract that is concerned primarily
with enforcing bargains clothed in objective indicia of consent.262
Formalist thinking about contract formation and enforcement was a
natural outgrowth of the burst of commercial growth and accompanying
laissez-faire approach to economics that dominated commerce during
the nineteenth century. 263 In short, contract law developed so as to
encourage individuals to freely enter bargains without fear of
government intervention. 264
Formalist thinking in contract doctrine has since persisted and has, in
fact, experienced a surge in popularity in recent years due to its many
unconscionability case, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.); Martin B. Shulkin,
Unconscionability—The Code, the Court, and the Consumer, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 367,
377–78 (1968) (reviewing early cases decided under UCC section 2-302).
258. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 25, at 287–89 (noting the uncertainty surrounding courts’
applications of the unconscionability doctrine).
259. See Prince, supra note 243, at 463–64, 463 n.15 (noting that during the 1990s, the study
group appointed to consider revising Article 2 of the UCC found that section 2-302 had not
proven to be the “unruly and fearsome creature that critics first anticipated”). See generally
James W. Johnson, Unconscionability and the Federal Chancellors: A Survey of U.C.C. Section
2-302 Interpretations in the Federal Circuits During the 1980’s, 16 LINCOLN L. REV. 21 (1985)
(finding that only one of the reported federal cases during the 1980s involving UCC section 2-302
clearly accepted the unconscionability claim).
260. Randall, supra note 16, at 194.
261. See Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 813 (discussing various interrelated factors
that contributed to the decline of the unconscionability doctrine); Knapp, supra note 16, at 613
(attributing the decline to the shift in consumer protection law from a litigation-based approach to
a legislative- and regulatory-based approach).
262. Morant, supra note 129, at 928. See Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party
Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L. REV. 493, 498 (2010) (defining formalism as
“a theory of contract law that, above all else, elevates the content of the parties’ written contract
(its form) over any concerns for normative values or societal notions of fairness”).
263. Morant, supra note 129, at 930.
264. Id. For a general discussion of classical contract theory and the role of government, see
SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 9–12.
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benefits. 265 Adherence to the objective theory of contract formation
fosters legal certainty and as a result, market stability. 266 Reliance on
formalist rules also provides for simplicity, both in bargain formation
and the adjudication of disputes. 267 Those who champion formalism
also argue that strict enforcement of contract rules promotes efficiency
and optimal distribution of economic resources. 268
However, since the nineteenth century, social and economic
conditions have changed dramatically. The vast majority of contracts
today are made between producers and consumers of products, with
consumers entirely dependent upon producers for nearly everything that
they eat, wear, and use. 269 Merchants almost always enjoy superior
bargaining power and exercise that power by controlling all terms in the
agreement. 270 The diversity and proliferation of products available on
the market and the sheer number of contracts made prevent the
consumer from gaining a deep understanding of either the product or the
contract made to secure it. 271 As a result, contracts are often very
unfavorable to consumers.
Classical contract doctrine generally makes little concession for the
bargaining power inequalities that plague consumers. The freedom of
contract principle prohibits a court from interfering with a contract that
may be perceived as unfair. 272 The objective theory of contract
formation and the accompanying duty to read prevent courts from
looking beyond objective manifestations of assent to determine if the
consumers understand contract terms. 273 And, although formalist
decision making may not always accurately reflect the realities of
contracting behavior, clear rules provide certainty without which the
economy could not function effectively. Reversal of the duty to read,
for example, would result in invalidation of all contracts an
overwhelming majority of consumer contracts. The unconscionability
doctrine, therefore, was designed to address the inadequacies of

265. Morant, supra note 129, at 942.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 73.
269. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 22.
270. Id. at 25.
271. Id. at 26.
272. Id. at 35. As explained by Professor Slawson, the freedom of contract principle prohibits
courts from either invalidating unfair contract provisions or supplanting unfair contract terms
with court-created substitutes: “The first option would violate the parties’ ‘freedom to’ include
anything in their contracts they chose. The second would violate their ‘freedom from’ laws that
would limit this freedom.” Id.
273. Id. at 36.
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classical contract theory by permitting limited exceptions to formalist
enforcement of bargains. 274
Unsurprisingly, the unconscionability doctrine has met considerable
criticism on formalist grounds. 275 The primary complaint concerns the
doctrine’s vagueness. 276 The lack of a precise definition provides
judges with wide latitude in its application and, as a result, judicial
determinations regarding unconscionability are perceived as overly
subjective. 277 Because the doctrine lacks clear statutory guidelines,
judicial findings of unconscionability are largely fact-based and difficult
to generalize. 278 Unconscionability is therefore condemned for creating
uncertainty regarding which agreements will be enforced and which will
be struck down. Furthermore, critics of unconscionability complain that
judicial intrusion into private dealings threatens contractual liberty and
conflicts with the freedom of will that is central to contract doctrine.279
These critics fear that judges will impose their personal values at the
expense of the individual will of the parties. 280 Such judicial oversight
is viewed as paternalism at its worst, shaking the very foundation of
contract law and market efficiency. 281 Broad social and political
backlash against “judicial activism” in matters outside of the contract
law realm have further compounded unconscionability’s disrepute. 282
The academic response to the tension between unconscionability and
classical contract theory has consisted primarily of a rejection of the
doctrine in favor of approaches to standardized contracts that arguably
fit more squarely with the resurgence in formalist thought. 283 Even
274. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 74.
275. Id. at 94–102.
276. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 31, at 559 (criticizing section 2-302 for “say[ing] nothing with
words”); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-3, at 155 (“Experimentation with even a single
case shows this [litmus] test to be . . . useless; in no sense is the Comment an objective definition
of the word. It is simply a [hopelessly subjective] synonym[] laden covered with a heavy value
burden: ‘oppression,’ ‘unfair,’ or ‘one-sided.’”); Spanogle, Jr., supra note 239, at 942 (“The terms
‘unfair surprise’ and ‘oppression’ are no more concretely definable than the term
‘unconscionable’ so the Comment seems to offer slogan words rather than an explanation of the
purposes behind the statute.”); cf. Randall, supra note 16, at 188 (“[T]he malleability of the
doctrine . . . is acknowledged as one of its chief virtues.”); Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at
73–74 (describing unconscionability as “a flexible safety net”).
277. Morant, supra note 129, at 942.
278. See Warkentine, supra note 5, at 484 (“[A]lthough there are now many cases that address
unconscionability, they have little value as precedents.”).
279. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 94.
280. Id. at 96.
281. Id. at 95–96.
282. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 763–64; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet
Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading
Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 189–204 (1998).
283. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 2, at 264 (“[T]he common law of contracts can and should
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scholars concerned with contract fairness and consumer protection
advocate legislative or administrative solutions to unconscionable terms
in standard contracts due to concerns about judicial interventionism in
contract disputes. 284 Repeated condemnation of unconscionability,
together with the association between unconscionability and
unrestrained judicial activism, discourage judges from thoughtfully
considering unconscionability claims. 285 Furthermore, as a result of
judicial distaste for the doctrine, consumers have become reluctant to
plead it. 286 As the number of claims dwindles, so too does the
remaining judicial appetite for the doctrine. Indeed, formalist scholars
praise the relative disuse of unconscionability as a triumph. 287
B. The Revival of Unconscionability
For decades, the story of unconscionability has been one of survival
rather than of growth. Despite persistent formalist criticism, the last
decade has been a period of reinvigoration for the doctrine. The number
of reported decisions in which unconscionability has been raised has
increased dramatically. 288 Perhaps more importantly, the success rate
of unconscionability claims has steadily risen as well. A number of
empirical studies demonstrate the revival of the unconscionability
doctrine in sharp detail. One study of reported decisions addressing
claims of unconscionability in 2002 and 2003 found 42.5% of those
claims proved successful for plaintiffs. 289 While this figure indicates
that unconscionability claims remain difficult to win, a comparison
across time indicates that unconscionability claims are becoming more
successful. 290 Another study that analyzed decisions between 1990 and
change in response to the changing needs of the day . . . .”); Prince, supra note 243, at 462 (noting
that some fear giving too much power to courts to strike items will lead to inconsistent and
unpredictable interference in contracts); Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 780 n.82, 840–
41 (noting a trend toward formalism that extends beyond just the Supreme Court and that “the
prevailing norm posits that the judicial role in policing contracts should be circumscribed”).
284. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 821.
285. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 92.
286. Morant, supra note 129, at 947.
287. See Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 92–99.
288. See Knapp, supra note 16, at 621–22 (noting that the “tide was beginning to turn” as
early as the mid-1990s).
289. Randall, supra note 16, at 194.
290. Id. at 196. For instance, Professor Randall found that only 16.7% of unconscionability
claims were successful between 1982 and 1983. Id. Other empirical studies have reached similar
findings. See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 16, at 619–26 (reporting a “substantial” increase in
unconscionability cases between 1990 and 2008); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The
Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1436–41 (2008) (reporting an increase in unconscionability challenges in
cases involving arbitration from 1% to 15–20% over time). Not all empirical studies support the
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2008 reported a “very definite increase” in the number of cases
involving unconscionability claims and an overall increase in the
success of those claims. 291
The bulk of the reported decisions raising unconscionability, and the
lion’s share of those in which the claim is successful, address the
unconscionability of arbitration clauses. 292 However, unconscionability
jurisprudence is not limited to arbitration clauses alone. A significant
number of decisions address a range of additional risk-shifting
provisions in standard form contracts. 293
In particular,
unconscionability claims attacking liquidated damages clauses,
limitation of liability or remedy clauses, and warranty disclaimer
clauses also enjoy a relatively high degree of success. 294
The increased popularity and success of the unconscionability
doctrine reflect a greater willingness among judges to exercise their
mandate to police unfair contracts. Moreover, the high success rates for
claims involving arbitration, remedy limitation, warranty disclaimers,
and liquidated damages clauses signal that judges are particularly
concerned with the substantive aspect of unconscionability. 295 While
some scholars initially speculated that the resurgence in
unconscionability was “activist” in nature, citing its restriction to
particular geographical areas, 296 recent empirical evidence indicates that
conclusion that the number of successful unconscionability claims is rising. For example,
Professors Larry A. DiMatteo and Bruce Louis Rich compared decisions reported between 1968
and 1980 with those reported between 1991 and 2003 and concluded that, although there was a
slight increase (7%) in the number of successful cases between the two time periods, the increase
was not significant. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1100–01. It is possible that this reported
increase was less dramatic than that seen in other studies because it included decisions rendered
in the late 1960s, before judicial interest in the doctrine experienced its first decline.
291. Knapp, supra note 16, at 621.
292. See Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability
Doctrine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 44–48 (2006) (finding that unconscionability challenges succeed more
frequently in California appellate courts when they involve arbitration clauses); Knapp, supra
note 16, at 622 (“Of the total number of unconscionability decisions gathered in our study, those
involving arbitration clauses accounted for the lion’s share of the overall increase.”); Randall,
supra note 16, at 194 (finding, in a study of unconscionability decisions reported between 2002
and 2003, that courts found nearly twice as many arbitration agreements unconscionable as other
types of clauses).
293. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1113.
294. See id. (citing a 60% success rate for claims against liquidated damages clauses, a 51%
success rate for claims against limitation of liability or remedy clauses, and a 41% success rate for
claims against disclaimer or warranty clauses; compared to a 75% success rate for claims against
arbitration clauses, and a 37.8% success rate for all other claims).
295. See id. (noting that these types of claims are highly “policed due to their inherent
substantive naughtiness”).
296. Broome, supra note 292, at 39–40; Prince, supra note 243, at 465; Amy J. Schmitz,
Consideration of “Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN’S L.
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both federal and state courts across the nation are increasingly
responding to unfair terms in standard form contracts. 297 Thus, on the
one hand, the empirical evidence suggests a broad and building trend
toward judicial rejection of the formalist opposition to
unconscionability. On the other hand, because the upward trend of
unconscionability is still relatively “mild,” with less than fifty percent of
unconscionability claims successful, there appears to be little risk of the
widespread judicial interference in contract that is so feared by the
doctrine’s critics. 298
C. The Sliding Scale’s Balance of Fairness and Formalism
The sliding scale approach may further assist in insulating the
doctrine from formalist attacks that undermine judicial oversight of
standardized terms. Although proponents of unconscionability have
long praised the doctrine for its ability to “protect core human values”
through judicial creativity, 299 few have directly addressed the chief
formalist critiques. 300 However, contract doctrine is unlikely to shed
the dominance of formalism. 301 Therefore, the continued vitality of
unconscionability and its utility as a tool for preventing abuses of
bargaining power depends upon its ability to accommodate formalist
concerns.
The conventional approach to unconscionability is decidedly
formalist. Requiring strong evidence of procedural unconscionability
maintains the ideal of freedom of contract by permitting judges to
interfere only in contracts that exhibit clear deficiencies in consent.302
High thresholds for substantive unconscionability prevent judges from
intervening in all but the most egregious of cases, ensuring that judges
will not use the doctrine inappropriately to impose their own subjective
views of fairness onto consumer contracts in the absence of clear
evidence of oppression or overreaching. 303 Thus, the conventional
approach to the doctrine carefully restricts judicial intervention to a
narrow subset of cases involving extreme unfairness and overreaching.
REV. 123, 142 (2007).
297. DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 50, at 1096; Knapp, supra note 16, at 623–35; Randall,
supra note 16, at 194–95.
298. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 809–10.
299. Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 73.
300. See, e.g., Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 792–93 (stating that the doctrine is
“perfectly consistent with the governing norms of contract and policy reasons underlying freedom
of contract: consent, bargain, free will, free exchange, and wealth maximization”).
301. Morant, supra note 129, at 929.
302. DOBBS, supra note 27, § 10.7.
303. Id.
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The sliding scale approach, on the other hand, represents resistance
against the formalist trend by the judiciary. The sliding scale’s
relaxation of the procedural inquiry permits judges more freedom to
substantively scrutinize the content of consumer contracts.
Furthermore, the sliding scale’s relaxed approach to substantive
unconscionability demonstrates that courts are increasingly comfortable
passing on the question of what is “unreasonable” or “unfair” in the
marketplace, though perhaps short of “outrageous.”
However, the sliding scale approach does not necessarily work
against formalist norms. For example, formalists are concerned with
individual freedom and fear that a liberal application of the
unconscionability doctrine will permit judges to supplant free choice
with personal notions of fairness. 304 Such thinking rests in part on an
assumption that consumers make rational choices that will lead to the
inclusion of efficient terms in negotiated contracts. 305 It therefore fails
to take cognizance that the vast majority of consumer contracts are not
freely negotiated and that consumers’ choices regarding the risks
inherent in those contracts are far from rational. Formalist thinking
about contract law is based also in concerns about economic efficiency
and optimal distribution of resources. However, such thinking is
premised on the discredited hypothesis that market forces will regulate
contract terms when consumers do not. A more robust use of
unconscionability to police consumer contracts in fact promotes
contractual freedom and economic efficiency by counterbalancing the
effects of consumers’ disadvantaged bargaining position. 306
The principal complaint regarding unconscionability concerns the
doctrine’s vagueness—formalists fear that fact-dependent, resultoriented unconscionability decisions will unpredictably upset
contractual expectations. 307 However, use of the sliding scale approach
should actually increase predictability in unconscionability
jurisprudence. Much of the uncertainty in the unconscionability
analysis concerns the procedural prong, as courts struggle to identify
specific factors indicating a lack of meaningful choice and disagree as
to what factors are the most appropriate indicators. To the extent that
the sliding scale approach deemphasizes these factors and instead
emphasizes the substance of contractual provisions, a more coherent
and predictable body of jurisprudence will evolve, particularly if courts
endorsing the sliding scale approach coalesce in finding the procedural
304.
305.
306.
307.

Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 94–96.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 94, 97–98.
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unconscionability prong satisfied by the existence of a contract of
adhesion.
Importantly, many judges employing a sliding scale approach
continue to exercise their power to invalidate offending contractual
terms in moderation. This self-limitation stems from judges’ underlying
belief in the importance of standardized contracts to the stability of the
marketplace and commercial operations. 308 At the same time, judges
who employ the sliding scale approach recognize that a measured
application of the unconscionability norm is both appropriate and
necessary for the proper functioning of the economy. One court,
addressing the tension between formalist concerns and contractual
fairness, explained:
Regardless, however, of the unease which its potential use produces,
the doctrine of unconscionability has a place in our jurisprudence so
that grossly unfair or one-sided contracts may be properly “policed.”
. . . In appropriate cases, the doctrine of unconscionability provides a
more than proper and valid basis for interdicting an inequitable result
which would otherwise flow from the cold enforcement of the terms
of a contract.
....
. . . While the risk of defining the doctrine through such a case-by-case
approach is the possible loss of restraint and consistency, the
advantage is a device inherently governed by the particular
circumstances of each case measured against the experiences of past
and present judges, the lifeblood of the common law. 309

The sliding scale approach, with its continued emphasis on defective
assent as a prerequisite to judicial intervention, permits judges to engage
in the policing of agreements only when the contracting process did not
effectively safeguard the individual will of the parties.
IV. CALIBRATING THE SLIDING SCALE APPROACH
Although the sliding scale’s relaxed approach to unconscionability
shows promise, it requires some fine-tuning to achieve its full potential.
Specific calibrations for the sliding scale approach are needed so as to
facilitate a careful and controlled expansion of the unconscionability
doctrine.
The following recommendations seek to bring the
unconscionability analysis into closer parallel with the realities of
consumer contracting while preventing it from attracting formalist
aggression that will impede its continued growth. These calibrations are
not intended to constrain the malleability of the unconscionability
308. Warkentine, supra note 5, at 472.
309. Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 918–20 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002).
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doctrine. Unconscionability’s flexibility remains one of its chief
virtues. However, some tempering is required to achieve greater
uniformity between the various state approaches and to ensure that the
doctrine continues to evolve toward greater protection of consumer
interests.
A. A Dual-Prong Approach
and judicial 311 criticism of unconscionability’s
Despite
two-prong analytical framework, a dual-prong approach is critical to its
continued success. The concepts of procedural and substantive
unconscionability are analytically distinct—each serves a unique
purpose. 312 Courts should therefore continue to require both procedural
and substantive unconscionability before refusing to enforce an
offending provision.
Procedural unconscionability—which looks for defects in the
bargaining process—is essential for establishing deficiencies in assent
that justify judicial intervention in contractual dealings. 313 A sliding
scale approach that continues to require some evidence of process
failure accommodates formalist concerns by preventing judicial
overreaching into freely negotiated contracts; a single-prong approach
that permits a finding of unconscionability on the basis of substantive
unconscionability alone goes too far by allowing courts to impose
personal or societal notions of fairness at the expense of personal
liberty. 314 Furthermore, a substantive unconscionability analysis devoid
of procedural inquiry doubles as a “public policy” inquiry in disguise, to
the detriment of the clarity of both devices for invalidating contracts.
Additionally, to the extent that courts view extreme evidence of
substantive unconscionability as implying some procedural
deficiency, 315 courts should take care to make this inference explicit.
academic 310

310. See, e.g., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 27, § 96(B)(2)(c) (proposing alternatives
to the “procedural/substantive dichotomy”); Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 109 (“[T]he
rigid two-prong test does not adequately address the needs of the textured and ever-changing
contracting market.”); Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection,
31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359, 374 (1969) (“The proposal here made is that the element of assent be
excised from the determination of unconscionability in consumer transactions.”).
311. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995) (noting that the
two-prong unconscionability framework is “based more on the historical reluctance of courts to
disturb contracts than on valid doctrinal underpinning”).
312. See supra Parts I.B.I and I.B.2 (explaining the procedural and substantive prongs).
313. See supra Part I.A.1 (explaining procedural unconscionability and the factors courts take
into consideration to determine whether a contract is procedurally unconscionable).
314. See supra Part I.C.1 (explaining that some courts have premised the finding of
unconscionability on substantive unconscionability alone).
315. See supra Part I.C.3 (explaining that the single-prong approach may be viewed as an
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The act of directly acknowledging procedural deficiencies permits
courts the opportunity to explore the deep problems with consent
associated with form contracts and, in particular, to explicitly
acknowledge that extremely one-sided contract terms are usually the
result of a lack of meaningful choice resulting from inequalities in
bargaining power. The assent inquiry afforded by a procedural
unconscionability analysis therefore serves both an expressive and an
evaluative function.
Moreover, evidence of substantive unconscionability, in the form of
unfairness or unreasonable risk allocation, ensures that economic
stability is not undermined by the needless invalidation of standard form
contracts on the basis of lack of meaningful assent alone. As experts’
understanding of the limits of consumer cognition and decision making
deepens, the argument that consumers are capable of meaningfully
assenting to standard form contracts becomes difficult to defend.316
Invalidation of contracts on the basis of lack of assent without evidence
of a substantive flaw in the contract would therefore result in the
disruption of the majority of contracts made by consumers in their
everyday dealings. Evidence of intolerable substantive unfairness is
needed to identify those contracts in which judicial interference is
justified.
Finally, the disruption of standard form contracts on the basis of lack
of assent alone does not serve any fruitful purpose. If the deficiencies
in consent could be remedied by providing consumers with streamlined
forms, additional information disclosures, and time to consider the
transaction, then invalidating contracts on the basis of procedural
unconscionability alone would encourage merchants to engage in
behaviors that would improve the overall contracting process. But the
evidence suggests that while the complexity of forms and pressures of
the contracting environment may exacerbate failures in consumer
decision making, more time and information do not cure them. Thus,
invalidation of form contracts on the basis of procedural deficiencies
alone promotes inefficiency by encouraging merchants to alter the
contracting process without any appreciable benefit to consumers in
terms of the content of form provisions.
B. A Meaningful Assent Inquiry
The primary strength of the sliding scale approach is its relaxation of
the procedural unconscionability prong. In applying the approach,
extension of the sliding scale approach).
316. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the psychological barriers to knowing assent).

ARTICLE_1_LONEGRASS.DOCX

2012]

The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability

11/9/2012 10:32 AM

59

courts should continue to refine the procedural unconscionability
analysis to deemphasize factors relating to the personal characteristics
of the contracting parties and the contracting environment that are
unhelpful in the determination of whether a party’s consent is flawed.
This adaptation of the procedural unconscionability prong should not
continue to be obscured by traditional common sense notions that a
party’s age, sophistication, or literacy level—or the particular form of
the contract—are central to the determination of free consent. Rather,
courts’ analyses should be informed by interdisciplinary research
regarding the actual realities of consumer decision making.
In applying the sliding scale approach, courts should treat the
procedural unconscionability prong as definitively established by the
existence of a consumer form contract of adhesion without requiring
additional factual evidence relating to either the consumer’s personal
characteristics or the specifics of the contracting environment. The
weight of the social science literature establishes that free consent is
undermined in consumer transactions wherever consumers are in fact
powerless or believe themselves to be powerless to negotiate contract
terms. Moreover, it is these situations in which the risk of overreaching
by merchants is greatest. The availability of a meaningful opportunity
to negotiate contract terms is therefore central to the procedural
unconscionability analysis.
Such an approach will require courts to refine their understanding of
bargaining power and, in so doing, unify many conflicting definitions of
the term “contract of adhesion.” While courts and commentators agree
that most form contracts are adhesionary, there is some disagreement
about the characteristics of a particular form contract that justify the
designation. 317 The main ingredient of an adhesion contract is the
inability to negotiate its terms. 318 But questions remain as to whether
inferior bargaining power is sufficient to destroy the opportunity to
negotiate, 319 or whether a complaining party must also show a lack of
317. Compare Rakoff, Adhesion, supra note 125, at 1177 (delineating seven individual
characteristics of adhesion contracts), with 1 PERILLO, CORBIN § 1.4 (describing, through
examples, adhesion contracts as those that are rigid and negotiable only as to a few provisions),
and 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
32:12, at 476–79 (4th ed. 1999) (defining adhesion contracts generally while citing to cases from
several states on the unconscionability of various adhesion contracts).
318. 11 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 317, § 32:12, at 476–79 (defining an adhesion
contract as “a contract entered without any meaningful negotiation by a party with inferior
bargaining power”).
319. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, LP, 341 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that
an agreement to arbitrate is procedurally unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, because
there is no opportunity for the parties to negotiate); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (stating that there was “little dispute” that an arbitration
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reasonable market alternatives. 320 Additionally, some courts have held
that otherwise adhesionary contracts cease to be so if the adherent had
an opportunity to review and reject individual terms after assenting to
the contract as a whole. 321
Furthermore, in assessing procedural unconscionability, courts should
resist the urge to find that evidence of heightened consent or disclosure
protects an adhesionary contract from scrutiny. Interdisciplinary
research makes clear that tactics aimed at providing consumers with
greater information do not alleviate the disparities in bargaining power
and free choice that undermine consent to consumer contracts. 322 When
judges improperly equate increased information with increased freedom
of choice, they risk insulating consumer contracts from appropriate
judicial review. 323
Finding the procedural unconscionability prong established by the
existence of a form contract of adhesion will also serve formalist norms.
agreement was adhesive because “[i]t was imposed on employees as a condition of employment
and there was no opportunity to negotiate”); Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622, 638
(Ct. App. 2011) (“Absent unusual circumstances, evidence that one party has overwhelming
bargaining power, drafts the contract, and presents it on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is sufficient to
demonstrate procedural unconscionability and require the court to reach the question of
substantive unconscionability, even if the other party has market alternatives.” (citing Gatton v.
T-Mobile USA, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 356 (Ct. App. 2007))).
320. See, e.g., Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 807 (Ct. App. 2005)
(stating that for a contract to be adhesionary, the consumer must lack “any realistic opportunity to
look elsewhere for a more favorable contract; he must either adhere to the standardized
agreement or forego the needed service” (quoting Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d
1178, 1185–86 (Cal. 1976) (emphasis added))).
321. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that an arbitration provision was not procedurally unconscionable based on a thirty-day
opt out clause); Clerk v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 09-05117, 2010 WL 364450, at *8–10
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010) (same); Fluke v. Cashcall, Inc., No. 08-5776, 2009 WL 1437593, at *8
(E.D. Pa. May 21, 2009) (holding that an arbitration provision containing a sixty-day opt out
clause was not unconscionable); Guadagno v. E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (C.D.
Cal. 2008) (same); Honig v. Comcast of Ga. I, LLC, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2008)
(holding that an arbitration provision containing a class action waiver and providing for a thirtyday opt out period was not unconscionable); Martin v. Del. Title Loans, Inc., No. 08-3322, 2008
WL 4443021, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2008) (holding that an arbitration provision containing a
fifteen-day opt out clause was not procedurally unconscionable); Sanders v. Comcast Cable
Holdings, LLC, No. 3:07-CV-918-J-33HTS, 2008 WL 150479, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008)
(holding that an arbitration provision containing a class action waiver and providing for a thirtyday opt out period was not unconscionable).
322. See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text.
323. See Hillman, Online Boilerplate, supra note 184, at 854 (predicting that mandatory
website disclosures will “backfire” under a sliding scale unconscionability analysis); WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 27, § 4-7 (noting that courts have not yet clearly addressed the question of
whether “super-conscionable” behavior can insulate a contract from scrutiny); Ben-Shahar &
Schneider, supra note 161, at 739 (“[A]n empty but formally correct disclosure can keep the
contract from being unconscionable, however problematic its terms.”).
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By deemphasizing factors unrelated to bargaining power, courts will
streamline the procedural unconscionability analysis, thus introducing
much needed consistency into the unconscionability framework.
Merchants may begin to make predictions regarding the scrutiny to
which their contracts will be subjected on the basis of external factors
related to the marketplace, rather than case-specific factors related to the
personal characteristics of the consumers with whom they transact.
Avoiding unnecessary analysis of the amount and quality of additional
information provided by merchants to consumers also will prevent
merchants from expending resources on disclosures that do little to aid
in consumer decision making. Thus, the sliding scale approach will
contribute to economic efficiency.
C. A Robust Fairness Inquiry
Streamlining the procedural unconscionability analysis provides the
additional benefit of permitting decision makers, commentators, and
merchants to focus their attention on the substance of consumer
contracts and to begin to develop clearer standards for the substantive
unconscionability norm. Of central importance is the question of “how
much” substantive unconscionability is required before a term found in
a standard contract of adhesion should be invalidated according to a
sliding scale analysis. In other words, does the existence of a form
contract of adhesion establish a “large” quantum of procedural
unconscionability sufficient to justify invalidation of an offending term
on the basis of the mere unreasonableness of an offending provision?
Or does the existence of a form contract of adhesion alone establish a
“small” quantum of procedural unconscionability, which must be offset
by extreme unfairness in order to justify relief?
The disparities in bargaining power characteristic of most consumer
form contracts of adhesion are serious in that they undermine consent to
most form terms. Therefore, when considering a form contract of
adhesion, it is inappropriate for courts to continue to apply conventional
standards for substantive unconscionability that would require offending
provisions to “shock the conscience.” Rather, the existence of a form
contract of adhesion should “tip the scale” significantly toward an
overall finding of unconscionability provided that the offending
provisions are found to be “commercially unreasonable” in their onesidedness. Recognition of the full extent to which assent is impaired by
disparate bargaining power will empower courts to more freely consider
the fairness of standardized terms without fear of overstepping formalist
limitations on judicial interventionism. However, in order to steer a
middle course between fairness and formalism, courts should demand
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evidence of significant unfairness to consumer interests before utilizing
their supervisory power to control form content. Consequently, courts
should routinely look to the commercial purpose of the provision in
question to determine whether it appropriately balances consumer and
merchant concerns. A substantive unconscionability inquiry too attuned
to consumer preferences will have the undesirable effect of upsetting
market stability and efficiency.
Courts should also avoid the “reasonable expectations” of consumers
when assessing substantive unconscionability. 324 First, attention to
reasonable expectations can result in the over-policing of commercially
reasonable form terms. A provision outside of the reasonable
expectations of a consumer may impose only slightly on consumer
interests while serving an important commercial purpose. Although
such a term may “surprise” consumers unfamiliar with industry
practices, absent an unjustified burden on consumer interests, the term
can hardly be considered sufficiently “oppressive” to justify relief.
Therefore, such a provision included in a consumer form contract
should not be subject to invalidation on the basis of substantive
unconscionability. A “reasonable expectations” inquiry may also result
in the under-policing of form provisions if well-known but oppressive
industry standards are allowed to escape judicial scrutiny.
Finally, a true sliding scale approach to unconscionability could
permit courts to more effectively police opportunistic or exploitative
merchant behavior in the marketplace.
For example, although
disclosure does little to ameliorate defects in consumer decision
making, deliberate obfuscation by merchants may exacerbate
deficiencies in consent. When faced with such evidence of “bad acts”
on the part of merchants, courts could conclude that this “greater”
evidence of procedural unconscionability warrants non-enforcement of
offensive provisions in the face of relatively mild unfairness in the
substance of the provisions themselves. Such an approach could be
reserved for egregious cases of consumer exploitation so as to deter
opportunistic behavior without unduly interfering in routine consumer
transactions.

324. A number of courts currently consider the “reasonable expectations” of the consumer as
central to the question of substantive unconscionability. See, e.g., Parada v. Superior Court, 98
Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 755 (Ct. App. 2009) (stating that if a contract is one of adhesion, the next
inquiry is whether it is “outside of ‘the reasonable expectations of the [weaker] part[y]’” (quoting
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172–73 (Cal. 1981))); Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala.
v. Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077, 1086–87 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 731
(Ala. 2002)) (stating that “unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh terms” are an element of
substantive unconscionability).
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CONCLUSION
The unconscionability doctrine will not single-handedly defeat the
use of unfair terms in standard form contracts. Moreover, the judicial
process is not necessarily the ideal forum for the development of farreaching and long-lasting regulation of contracts. 325 Courts develop the
law slowly and on a case-by-case basis and cannot, acting alone,
provide a comprehensive and timely solution to every problematic form
term in the market. 326
However, unconscionability need not be a panacea in order to be an
important and effective means of protecting consumers in the modern
marketplace. Though numerous reforms of, and alternatives to, the
doctrine of unconscionability have been proposed, none have taken
hold. The most promising opportunity for improvement to the doctrine,
the 2003 revision of Article 2, produced only cosmetic changes to the
UCC’s unconscionability provision. 327 Other legislative attempts to
regulate standard form contracts in a comprehensive fashion have
failed, often miserably. 328 Industry-specific regulation of standardized
terms has been marginally more successful, but these narrowly targeted
schemes provide insufficient protection for consumers. 329 Proposals for
comprehensive administrative oversight of form contracts, 330 though
attractive on some levels, remain practically and politically
unworkable. 331 Judicial control of standard form contracts is therefore
the best available means of providing the broadest cross section of
meaningful consumer protection against one-sided provisions in
standardized forms.
325. Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative
Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2002).
326. Becher, Asymmetric Information, supra note 142, at 771–72. See Todd D. Rakoff, The
Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235, 1244–45 (2006) [hereinafter Rakoff,
Boilerplate] (arguing that judges can only police the outer limits of problematic contracts, leaving
the rest to be solved by the legislature and administrative agencies).
327. Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the Unconscionability
Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. REV. 359, 384–85 (2001). The drafting committee changed only one
thing—the word “clause” to “term.” This change resulted from the drafter’s desire to incorporate
the word “term,” which was defined by Article 2 and is thus more meaningful and clear than
“clause.” Id.
328. Warkentine, supra note 5, at 505–06 (discussing failed legislative proposals on the
problem of standard form contracts and concluding that “it is highly unlikely that the legislature
will solve the issue of assent to standard form contract terms”).
329. See Schmitz, Safety Net, supra note 12, at 101–02 (discussing state legislative treatment
of catfish products, health spa memberships, used watches, and dance lessons).
330. See generally Bates, supra note 325 (advocating in favor of administrative regulation of
standard form contracts).
331. Rakoff, Boilerplate, supra note 326, at 1245 (discussing problems of “political will”
affecting legislative and administrative oversight of standard form contracts).
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Moreover, if effective legislation or administrative regulation of form
contracts is ever to be achieved, some consensus must be reached
regarding the appropriate limitations necessary to balance the interests
of consumers and industry. The judiciary has a crucial role to play in
developing these limitations. Judicial intervention in standard contracts
has long served an important “signaling function”—calling attention to
gaps in the law that have failed to protect consumers against
overreaching. 332 This judicial signaling function is exactly what
Llewellyn had in mind when he suggested that the “courts’ business is
eminently the marking out of the limits of the permissible . . . .”333
American contract law is, after all, predominantly judge-made law. 334
Although unconscionability has fallen out of vogue among academic
commentators, 335 its continued and often creative use by courts
demonstrates that it is still a vital doctrine, and one that is sufficiently
flexible to respond to the realities of consumer contracting. Academics
will, and should, continue to search for optimal solutions to the standard
contract dilemma. In the meantime, judicial control of standardized
terms should be fostered, encouraged, and guided toward the highest
probability of success. Professor Todd Rakoff recently cautioned that
“the traditional analysis of what is ‘best’ may cause us to lose sight of
what is only ‘better,’” and suggested that “[i]t is a mistake to assume
that, because judges cannot do everything, therefore they can do, or
ought to do, nothing.” 336 A judicial solution to form contracts should
not be discouraged simply because legislative and administrative
solutions remain lacking. 337 Instead, the critical role of the judiciary in
shaping norms for contractual fairness should be embraced and
empowered.

332. Knapp, supra note 16, at 614. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that the increased use
of the unconscionability doctrine to police arbitration provisions has discouraged in-house
counsel from enforcing the arbitration provisions contained within their own forms. Warkentine,
supra note 5, at 546 (citing Leslie A. Gordon, Clause for Alarm, as Arbitration Costs Rise, InHouse Counsel Turn to Mediation or a Combined Approach, 92 A.B.A. J. 19 (Nov. 2006)).
333. LLEWELLYN, DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 5, at 367 (quoting Llewellyn, Book
Review, supra note 248, at 704).
334. SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES, supra note 28, at 10.
335. See Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 840 (“The unconscionability norm has
unfortunately become a disfavored stepchild of contract law.”).
336. Rakoff, Boilerplate, supra note 326, at 1245.
337. Stempel, Equilibrium, supra note 111, at 842.

